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Throughout the Rehnquist Court’s so-called federalism revolution,
as the Court cut back on federal power under Article I and the Civil
War Amendments, many commentators asserted that the spending
power was next to go on the chopping block. But in the last years of
the Rehnquist Court, a majority of Justices seemed to abandon the
federalism revolution, and in the end, the Rehnquist Court never got
around to limiting Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. This
Article contends that it is wrong to expect the Roberts Court to be so
charitable about Congress’s exercise of the spending power. But the
Court is not likely to limit the spending power in the way some hoped
and some feared the Rehnquist Court would—by imposing direct
limitations on the kinds of legislation Congress has power to pass
under the Spending Clause. Direct limitations such as those proposed
by Professors John Eastman, Lynn Baker, and Mitchell Berman are
unlikely to find favor in the Roberts Court’s cases. Rather, the Court
is likely to act indirectly—through doctrines that skew the
interpretation and limit the enforceability of conditional spending
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statutes. Those doctrines are both more analytically tractable and less
ideologically problematic for conservative Justices than are the direct
limitations that might be imposed on the spending power. In other
words, the paradigm case for the Roberts Court’s restriction of the
spending power is likely to be not United States v. Butler, but rather
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Throughout the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution,” as
the Court cut back on federal power under Article I and the Civil
War Amendments, many commentators asserted that the spending
power was next to go on the chopping block. The spending power
1. Various commentators, writing in medias res, described the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism decisions as carrying out a “federalism revolution.” See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 30 (2001); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of
Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
367, 370 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 618 (2003). See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). For those
who, even at the time, saw those decisions as less than revolutionary, see Charles Fried, The
Supreme Court, 1994 Term—Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 34–45 (1995);
Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J.
47, 48–52 (2003); Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State
Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551,
1552 (2003) (book review).
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seemed to offer Congress a way to circumvent the limitations the
Court had imposed on the other legislative powers. Both legislators
and scholars therefore offered proposals for reframing as conditional
spending legislation those statutes the Court had held to exceed other
2
federal powers. In turn, a number of commentators expressed
concern (or in some cases hope) that the enactment of such proposals
would prompt the Court to place new limitations on Congress’s
3
authority to impose conditions on the receipt of federal money. To
defenders of states’ rights, the spending power now seemed “[t]he
4
greatest threat to state autonomy,” and was thus likely to be the next
front in the federalism revolution.
But a funny thing happened on the way to Yorktown. In the last
years of the Rehnquist Court, a majority of the Justices seemed to
abandon the federalism revolution and to cast doubt on whether
5
there had even been a revolution at all. In 2003, the Court upheld the
2. See S. 928, 107th Cong. (2001) (conditioning federal funding to states on their waiver of
sovereign immunity for some violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967);
Ann Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, the More You Save: Can the Spending Clause Save
Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1111, 1168 (2001); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1331, 1375–80 (2001); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 192–93 (2002); cf. Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the “Sounds of Sovereignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New
Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11, 17 (1998) (“In sum, even in this brave new world
of post-post New Deal federalism, there is really no doubt that South Dakota v. Dole permits
Congress to use the spending power to accomplish indirectly that which it may not accomplish
directly.”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 859, 864 n.23 (2000) (stating that the Court’s continued acceptance of the conditional
spending power “suffuses the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, threatening to reduce all of it to
a matter of form rather than substance”).
3. For prominent examples of scholars making such claims, see Lynn A. Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1914 (1995); Lynn A.
Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending
Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460–61
(2003); Daniel O. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores:
The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local
Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633, 674–80 (1998); Daniel J. Meltzer, The
Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 53–54.
4. Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195,
195 (2001).
5. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 509
(2006) (“[I]t seems fairly clear, at least as of 2006, that the ‘federalism revolution’ has been
substantially slowed, if not stopped in its tracks.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of
Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1764 (2006) (“In the last few years of the Rehnquist Court,
however, the federalism revolution waned as the Court consistently ruled in favor of federal
power.”); Mark Tushnet, “Meet the New Boss”: The New Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1205,
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Family and Medical Leave Act as valid Fourteenth Amendment
6
enforcement legislation in a decision whose reasoning seemed
7
inconsistent with the reasoning of earlier cases in the “revolution.”
And although in 2001 the Court had held that Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was not valid Fourteenth
8
Amendment enforcement legislation, in 2004 the Court held that
Title II of the ADA was, in at least some circumstances, valid
9
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation —a decision that
10
again seemed to reject much of the reasoning of that earlier case.
And in 2005, the Court held that Congress has power under the
Commerce Clause to prohibit the purely intrastate possession of
11
home-grown marijuana used for medicinal purposes —a decision that
many commentators saw as inconsistent with the decisions in United
12
13
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, which were the
Lexington and Concord (or, perhaps, the Trenton and Princeton) of
14
the revolution.
In the end, the Rehnquist Court never got around to limiting
15
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. But the Court did not
lack cases that might have raised the question. In Sabri v. United

1226 (2005) (“The cases are available for more substantial development in the future, but for
now the Court has moved back only inches from where the Warren Court left it.”).
6. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003).
7. For a strong statement of this point, see Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent,
2003 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232–33. Robert Post expressed a similar view in The Supreme Court,
2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 11–17 (2003).
8. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
9. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004).
10. See id. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Because today’s decision is irreconcilable
with Garrett and the well-established principles it embodies, I dissent.”).
11. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
12. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?: Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law)
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 753 (2005) (“While the Raich majority purports to be
following the doctrinal contours of Lopez and Morrison, it actually represents a repudiation of
these prior cases.”); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906, 918–19 (2006) (contrasting Lopez and Raich).
For a balanced assessment of Raich, which considers the case “[a] [b]ad [d]ay for [s]tate
[a]utonomy,” see Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist
Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21.
15. See Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY
L.J. 1, 14 (2006) (noting that, even after the “federalism revolution,” “conditional funding
remains an effectively unbridled source of federal power”).

BAGENSTOS IN FINAL2.DOC

2008]

SPENDING CLAUSE LITIGATION

11/16/2008 9:58:47 PM

349

16

States, the Court upheld a prohibition on bribing officials in federally
17
funded programs —a case that many thought pressed the limits of
18
Congress’s spending power. And in two cases that arose during the
late Rehnquist Court, court of appeals judges wrote dissenting
opinions in which they argued that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
19
Act exceeded Congress’s conditional spending power. Section 504
requires recipients of federal funds to refrain from discriminating on
20
the basis of disability. Though Section 504 was enacted in 1973,
seventeen years before Congress enacted the ADA, the plaintiffs’
invocation of Section 504 could readily be seen as an effort to
circumvent the limitations that the Court had imposed on the
constitutionality of the ADA. Yet the Rehnquist Court repeatedly
denied certiorari in cases that had upheld the constitutionality of
21
Section 504.
In its first two significant cases addressing the scope of federal
power—cases that ruled (narrowly) in favor of federal abrogations of
state sovereign immunity—the Roberts Court seemed to follow the
22
same nonrevolutionary line as did the late Rehnquist Court. One

16. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
17. Id. at 602.
18. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 116 n.118 (2004) (finding Sabri
“troubling” for this reason); Smith, supra note 14, at 919–20 & n.80 (discussing arguments for
the unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 666). An important pre-Sabri article argued that § 666 was
unconstitutional. See Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39–84 (2003). For a (hardly disapproving)
discussion of the expansiveness of Sabri’s understanding of congressional power, see Neil S.
Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1976–78 (2005).
19. See Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1171–75 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082–84 (8th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (Bowman, J., joined by Beam, Loken & Bye, JJ., dissenting).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
21. See Barbour, 374 F.3d at 1170, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 904 (2005); Lovell v. Chandler, 303
F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302
F.3d 161, 176 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1232 (2003); Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d
1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145,
1148 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 269
F.3d 626, 628–29 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002); Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1081–82,
cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001).
22. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005 (2006) (holding that Congress
may displace state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause);
United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 882 (2006) (holding that Title II of the ADA validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity as applied to cases in which the conduct that violated the
statute also violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
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might, therefore, expect the Roberts Court also to be charitable about
Congress’s exercise of the spending power. If the Court is not
attempting to impose revolutionary constraints on Congress’s powers
under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, it has
no particular reason to stand guard against Congress’s
“circumvention” of those constraints under the spending power. At
least one informed commentator has suggested that advocates of
conditional spending legislation have little to fear from the Roberts
23
Court.
In this Article, I contend that it is wrong to expect the Roberts
Court to be so charitable about Congress’s exercise of the spending
24
power. To the extent that the Roberts Court has a conservative
agenda, and the liberal welfare and civil-rights state continues to be
built on conditional spending legislation, the Court will have a strong
incentive to limit that legislation. But the Court is not likely to do so
in the way some hoped and some feared the Rehnquist Court
would—by imposing direct limitations on the kinds of legislation
Congress has power to pass under the Spending Clause. Rather, the
Court is likely to act indirectly—through doctrines that skew the
interpretation and limit the enforceability of conditional spending
statutes. Those doctrines have a strong pedigree in existing law, and
they are both more analytically tractable and less ideologically
problematic for conservative Justices than are the direct limitations
25
that might be imposed on the spending power.
In other words, the paradigm case for the Roberts Court’s
restriction of the spending power is not likely to be United States v.
26
Butler —the New Deal–era case that invalidated the first
Agricultural Adjustment Act as going beyond Congress’s taxing and
27
spending power. Rather, the paradigm case may be Arlington
28
Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy. In Arlington
Central, the Roberts Court held that the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) did not authorize prevailing parents to

23. Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts Hearings Junk the Rehnquist
Court’s Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 30–35 (2006).
24. I think the Roberts Court is likely to impose at least some limitations on the exercise of
other federal powers as well, but that is beyond the scope of my argument here.
25. For a brief suggestion that the Court ought to move in this direction, see Ernest A.
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 144–45 (2004).
26. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
27. Id. at 78.
28. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
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29

recover expert fees. The Court could have reached that result as a
30
matter of ordinary statutory interpretation. But it went out of its way
to emphasize (repeatedly) that because “Congress enacted the IDEA
pursuant to the Spending Clause,” the statute could not impose
obligations on states unless Congress provided “clear notice”—
beyond what would be required outside of the conditional spending
31
context—“regarding the liability at issue.”
Arlington Central may seem like a narrow case, and in some
respects it is. But the “clear notice” principle it adopts could have farreaching consequences for the enforcement of such important federal
32
laws as the statutes that set up the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
And a panel of the Sixth Circuit has already relied extensively on
Arlington Central to effect substantial restrictions on the obligations
33
the No Child Left Behind Act places on school districts. (As this
article went to press, the Sixth Circuit had granted en banc rehearing
but not yet issued a final ruling.) The time is ripe for an assessment of
the indirect limitations the Court is likely to place on conditional
34
spending legislation.

29. Id. at 2457.
30. See id. at 2464–65 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(agreeing with the Court’s conclusion that the statute’s language failed to include expert fees
without reaching the notice question).
31. Id. at 2458–59 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2460 (“Thus, the text
of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) does not authorize an award of any additional expert fees, and it
certainly fails to provide the clear notice that is required under the Spending Clause.”); id. at
2461 (“Certainly the terms of the IDEA fail to provide the clear notice that would be needed to
attach such a condition to a State’s receipt of IDEA funds.”); id. at 2463 (“Whatever weight this
legislative history would merit in another context, it is not sufficient here. . . . In a Spending
Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the Members of both Houses intend but what the
States are clearly told regarding the conditions that go along with the acceptance of those
funds.”). For an excellent discussion and critique of Arlington Central, see generally Brian
Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 89 B.U. L. REV. 875 (2008).
32. Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for
States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 486–92 (2008).
33. See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 261–73 (6th
Cir. 2008), vacated on rehearing en banc, No. 05-2708, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12121 (6th Cir.
May 1, 2008).
34. I discuss the most comprehensive previous treatment of indirect limits, Brian Galle,
Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional
Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155 (2004), in Part II. See infra text accompanying
note 330. (Professor Galle extends those arguments in his more recent work. Galle, supra note
31.) It is important to note at the outset the ways in which my analysis differs from Galle’s.
Galle limits his focus to arguing against the notice principle. My argument, by contrast, is not
principally a normative critique. Instead, I (a) show why the Court is not likely to impose direct
limits but is likely to impose indirect limits; (b) attempt to describe, with some precision, the
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My argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain why I do
not believe that the Court is likely to impose significant direct
limitations on the conditional spending power, whether by tightening
35
the limitations set forth in the leading case of South Dakota v. Dole
or by adopting the proposals put forth by leading commentators. That
Part adds to the literature by offering the first comprehensive
response to the proposals of Professors Lynn Baker, Mitchell
Berman, and John Eastman for invigorating direct limitations on
conditional spending legislation. In Part II, I explain why I believe the
Court is quite likely to impose more stringent indirect limitations on
the conditional spending power. Section A addresses the strong
contract theory proposed by David Engdahl in the leading modern
article on the spending power (under which spending conditions are
not “law” at all) and argues that it is possible, but not especially
likely, that the Court will endorse that theory. Section B, which
considers the notice principle, adds to the prior literature by
disaggregating applications of that principle into three basic types,
which potentially have different normative implications, and assessing
each of those types separately.
My principal goal is analytic and predictive; I focus on the
direction Spending Clause litigation is likely to travel in the Roberts
Court. A significant part of my argument rests on analytic and
normative concerns with some possible directions the Court might
travel. But I offer no particular account of what the law should look
like in this area, except perhaps by implication. I hope my account
will convince readers who share my normative views as well as
readers who do not share those views.
Moreover, I offer no high-level positive theory about what
motivates a majority of the Court. Instead, I explain along the way
different variants of the notice principle; and (c) assess as well the “strong contract theory”
adopted by at least one federal court under which conditional spending legislation is not “law”
at all. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 104–08 (1994). Moreover, to
the extent that I am also critical of the notice principle, my arguments are different from Galle’s;
in particular, Galle’s arguments would apply to any federalism-based clear-statement rule, but I
accept the validity of such rules in general. See infra note 315. Professors Peter Smith and David
Freeman Engstrom have also discussed the notice principle, though their discussions aim more
at identifying how that principle should be interpreted (in contexts in which federal agencies
interpret ambiguous spending statutes) than on predicting how the Court will apply that
principle. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1197 passim (2004); Peter J. Smith, Essay, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power,
110 YALE L.J. 1187 passim (2001).
35. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–11 (1987).
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the reasons why I think the Court is or is not likely to adopt particular
rules of Spending Clause doctrine. My basic premise is that this is a
conservative Court and is likely, all else equal, to serve
36
“conservative” interests. But “‘judicial conservatism’ is not a
37
coherent single project of constitutional interpretation.”
Importantly, the interests of conservative judges fall into several
categories. They may be programmatic interests (that is, interests in
38
upholding “conservative” statutes and invalidating “liberal” ones).
There are a number of conservative political programs that might
39
come into tension with each other in many cases. Professor Young,
36. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 423
(2007) (“Conservatives finally got their court. That is the central message of the Supreme
Court’s 2006 Term.”). For another good discussion of the Roberts Court as a conservative
Court, see generally Mark A. Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a
Conservative Era, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 675 (2006).
37. Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 817–18 (2005). This is true of judicial liberalism as well. See
Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV.
785, 798–800.
38. Professor Richard Fallon argued, before the Rehnquist Court sided with federal power
in its last few federalism cases, that “[t]he Court’s pro-federalism majority is at least as
substantively conservative as it is pro-federalism. When federalism and substantive
conservatism come into conflict, substantive conservatism frequently dominates.” Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 429, 434 (2002). This is the “policy-focused instrumentalism” that Professor Peter Smith
believes was characteristic of Rehnquist Court federalism cases. Smith, supra note 14, at 911–15.
Professor Frank Cross argues, persuasively in my view, “that federalism is consistently (and I
contend inherently) employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some other ideological end,
rather than as a principled end in and of itself.” Frank B. Cross, Essay, Realism About
Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307 (1999). But even if one does not agree with that
statement, it should be plain enough that federalism can be and has been used as such a tool
some proportion of the time.
39. For a good overview of the point, see Fallon, supra note 38, at 446–52. In part for this
reason, Professor Young suggests that it makes no sense to treat Supreme Court decisions as
“liberal” or “conservative”:
The problem is that it is hard to distinguish between a “preference” for federalism of
the sort just described and a good faith legal view about the meaning of the
Constitution. In the immunity cases, for instance, how much conceptual daylight is
there between a “preference” that states not be subject to suit and a legal conviction
that the Constitution contains a strong principle of state immunity? One cannot prove
the primacy of political preferences over legal principle if one’s definition of political
preferences is so broad as to include legal principles.
Young, supra note 14, at 14–15 (footnote omitted). It does not particularly matter to me,
however, whether one regards the conservative interests I have described as “political
preferences” or “good faith legal views.” I take no position on the relative weight of “politics”
and “law” in Supreme Court decisions (or on whether it makes sense to draw a strong
distinction between them). I argue only that conservatism—whether as a “political” or a “legal”
principle—is likely to explain and predict the Roberts Court’s federalism decisions, all else
equal.
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for example, identifies six different but overlapping strands in
contemporary
American
political
conservatism—economic
conservatives, Libertarians, traditionalists, social or religious
40
conservatives, neoconservatives, and anti-Communists —and one can
find programmatic disputes within each strand. Conservative judges
may seek to maximize the degree to which their decisions support
their favored programmatic interests directly—by seeking to advance
those interests in each case—or in a rule-consequentialist manner by
articulating and defending rules that ensure that, over time,
conservative programmatic interests will be upheld to the greatest
extent possible, even if in any given case those rules might serve
liberal programmatic interests. They may also seek in their decisions
to adhere to conservative ideological constructs, regardless of those
constructs’ effect on conservative programmatic interests. These
constructs may be very general, like notions of personal
responsibility, or they may be specific to constitutional adjudication,
41
42
like notions of originalism, states’ rights, or judicial restraint. There
are many such constructs, and they, too, will stand in tension in many
43
cases. Moreover, all of these conservative interests may in any given
case be trumped by other interests—particularly a Justice’s interest in
following what he or she (not to mention the public) understands to
44
be the practices of careful and principled lawyering. That interest
45
pushes toward adhering to precedent (at least on the surface ) and
46
avoiding rules that are analytically unstable.
40. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1139, 1192–94 (2002).
41. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 562–68 (2006) (reviewing the judicial use of originalism
constructs in decisionmaking).
42. For an argument that conservatives should support federalism, irrespective of its effect
on conservative programmatic interests, see generally Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case
for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874 (2006).
43. See Young, supra note 40, at 1198–202.
44. Professor Young sees this, correctly in my view, as a form of conservatism, see id. at
1196, though it is a form of conservatism that is shared by most “conservative” and “liberal”
judges. Writing of the Rehnquist Court, Professor Mark Tushnet argued that “Justices in the
new regime seek to show that they are technically competent lawyers who do small things very
well.” Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Foreword: The New Constitutional
Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspirations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 91 (1998). I
believe that continues to be true in the Roberts Court.
45. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 491–92 (discussing the Rehnquist Court).
46. See id. at 493 (noting that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism cases had “proceeded
cautiously along doctrinal paths where previous efforts to protect federalism occasioned
embarrassment”).
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Although the distinctions between and tensions among these
various interests can make a great deal of difference to the shape of
jurisprudence in general, they are less significant to my project. I
hope to show that efforts to impose direct limitations on the spending
power are sufficiently analytically intractable, and threaten such an
array of conservative interests, that a conservative Court is unlikely to
undertake them. My picture of what moves the majority should
resonate with observers of the Roberts Court, even if one might
quibble with aspects of it. But I make no attempt to defend it here.
Doing so would require an article of its own.
I. THE FAILURE OF DIRECT LIMITATIONS
The Supreme Court’s Dole opinion set forth three possible direct
47
limitations on Congress’s exercise of its conditional spending power.
The first is the “general welfare” limitation: “the exercise of the
48
spending power must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’” The
second (stated somewhat more tentatively) is the “nexus” limitation:
“our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that
conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated
49
‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”
And the third is the “coercion” limitation: “in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to
50
pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”
None of these direct limitations on the spending power has had
any real bite in the cases. In this Part, I contend that none is likely to
have any real bite in the future. Some of the reason has to do with the
particular limitations themselves: neither the general welfare, nexus,
nor coercion limitations impose any analytically tractable limitation
on congressional power. Any effort to impose robust limits on the
spending power based on these doctrines (or on the various

47. I discuss only those limitations that are internal to the spending power; the Court also
recognized that Congress exceeds its spending authority if it conditions a grant on conduct that
independently violates the Constitution. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1987)
(“Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state
action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of the
Congress’ broad spending power.”).
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
50. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).

BAGENSTOS IN FINAL2.DOC

356

11/16/2008 9:58:47 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:345

alternatives to these doctrines proposed by leading scholars) is
doomed to embarrassment. I explain in Section A.
Analytic embarrassment will not deter a court that is bent on
reaching particular results. But as I show in Section B, there is no
good reason to believe that the Roberts Court has any particular
mission to constrain Congress’s spending power. If anything, one
should expect the contrary.
A. The Failure of Specific Limiting Doctrines
1. General Welfare. Under the Supreme Court’s modern
doctrine, forged in the 1937 New Deal settlement, the “general
51
welfare” limitation on the spending power is not a limitation at all.
52
In Helvering v. Davis, which upheld the old-age benefits of the
Social Security Act as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing and
53
spending power, the Court declared that “[w]hen money is spent to
promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is
54
55
shaped by Congress.” By the time of Buckley v. Valeo nearly forty
years later, the Court was flirting with the proposition that the
Constitution’s “general welfare” language imposes no limits on
56
Congress’s spending power. In Dole, the Court retreated somewhat,
but not much; the Court held that “[i]n considering whether a
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes,
57
courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress,” and
it reaffirmed Helvering’s statement “that ‘the concept of welfare or
58
the opposite is shaped by Congress.’” Dole therefore left little room
for judicial enforcement of the general welfare limitation.
Some commentators have advocated a tightening—and
invigorated judicial enforcement—of that limitation, however.
Professor John Eastman has offered the leading statement of this
position: “Congress, I contend, has only the power to spend for the
51. Professor Michele (Landis) Dauber traces the doctrine even earlier, to the turn of the
twentieth century. See Michele Landis Dauber, Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse, 23
LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 452–53 (2005). But it is fair to say that the New Deal settlement
cemented deference firmly in the law.
52. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
53. Id. at 645.
54. Id.
55. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
56. See id. at 90–91.
57. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
58. Id. at 208 (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 645).
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‘general’ welfare and not for the special welfare of particular regions
or states, even if the spending was undertaken in all regions or all
states and therefore might be said to enhance ‘general’ welfare in the
59
aggregate.” Eastman’s argument is essentially originalist in nature;
he derives his rule from practice under the Articles of Confederation
60
and, up to the Civil War, under the Constitution. Relying on the
ratification debates, Professor Robert Natelson similarly contends
that “the goal of the General Welfare Clause was to limit all
congressional taxation and spending to general interest, as opposed to
61
local or special interest, purposes.”
One might agree or disagree with these originalist arguments, but
in any event the doctrine they support is very unlikely to have
traction in the courts. Any doctrine that would put the courts in the
position of second-guessing Congress’s determination of what is in
the “general welfare” will necessarily raise the concern (one to which
62
conservative judges remain quite attuned) that the courts are
repeating what is understood to be the mistake of Lochner v. New
63
York —the judicial arrogation of authority to decide whether
64
legislation is in fact in the general interest. Although defenses of
Lochner and unapologetic judicial activism have gained increasing
65
currency among right-wing legal activists and academics, the public
face of judicial conservatism—the face presented in confirmation

59. John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L.
REV. 63, 65 (2001).
60. See id. at 72–87.
61. Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in
Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 49 (2003).
62. See Graber, supra note 36, at 685.
63. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
64. For a good effort to connect invigorated judicial review of “general welfare” with what
is understood to be the mistake of Lochner, see Larry Yackle, Lochner: Another Time, Another
Place, 85 B.U. L. REV. 765, 777 (2005).
It is obvious enough that the legislative branch must be entitled to decide what counts
as the public interest in general. The Court could second-guess Congress at that level
of generality only by sounding very much like Justice Peckham explaining why the
Bake Shop Act didn’t further the public health. Just as choosing among publicregarding purposes is for state legislatures in police power cases, selecting among
public-regarding ends must equally be left to Congress in spending power cases.
Id. (footnote omitted).
65. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1521–25 (2005).
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hearings and appellate opinions—remains one of Bickellian restraint
66
and deference to the political branches.
The arguments of Professors Eastman and Natelson might seem
to avoid that concern. They appear to pose an equal-protection-like
inquiry: was Congress’s taxing and spending in the general interest or
only in someone’s (or some region’s or state’s) particular interest?
But (at least on one prominent view) the decisions of the Lochner era
rested on the closely related notion that “class legislation” (special
interest, as opposed to general-interest, legislation) was
67
unconstitutional. It is unlikely that a judicial effort to determine
what legislation serves the general as opposed to some region’s
particular welfare would be any more successful than the Lochner-era
effort to distinguish class legislation from general-interest legislation.
Intellectual developments since World War II have made it
difficult even to conceive of a general welfare distinct from the
aggregation of the welfare of various special interests. In particular,
interest-group theory persuasively demonstrates that most, if not all,
legislation is the outcome of a struggle between groups pursuing their
68
own interests. A number of scholars have drawn on interest-group

66. See Graber, supra note 36, at 685 (“Prominent conservative scholars have made
constitutionally reasonable arguments that the Court in Lochner v. New York correctly held
that maximum hour laws were constitutionally suspect. Nevertheless, the vast majority of
conservative Justices and scholars still maintain that Lochner was a gross abuse of the judicial
power.” (footnotes omitted)). As Professor Simon Lazarus shows, that face of Bickellian
restraint was front and center in Justice John Roberts’s confirmation hearings. See Lazarus,
supra note 23, at 14–18.
67. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 47 (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 49–50
(1993); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 246 (2000). But see
David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 21–31 (2003) (arguing that although preLochner lower-court cases rested on opposition to class legislation, Lochner reflected a shift to a
notion of fundamental individual rights); Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive
Due Process in the Taft Era Court, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1502–03 (1998) (arguing that the
substantive due process decisions of the Taft Court, rather than resting on opposition to class
legislation, represented an effort to protect the decisions of “everyday life” from regulation).
For a rejoinder to Professors Bernstein and Post, see generally Barry Cushman, Some Varieties
and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2005).
68. Professor Jerry Mashaw best captures the interest-group theory’s view of legislation:
“[It is the] vector sum of political forces expressed through some institutional matrix which has
had profound, but probably unpredictable and nontraceable, effects on the policies actually
expressed. There is no reason to believe that these expressions represent either rational
instrumental choices or broadly acceptable value judgments.” Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics
of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 123, 134 (1989). For a
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theory to urge that courts should invalidate (or skeptically construe)
legislation that reflects the disproportionate influence of particular
69
interests. But as Professor Einer Elhague has shown, it is impossible
to conclude that legislation reflects “disproportionate influence”
without some contestable normative theory about what are proper
70
outcomes.
The same problem will occur in attempting to determine whether
a federal spending program serves the general welfare. The essential
problems are twofold: every spending program—even one that gives
money to very particular places and projects—will ultimately serve
some general interests (if only the interest in Keynesian stimulus);
and no spending program will ever incontestably serve everyone’s
interests to precisely the same extent. As a result, any judicial effort
to enforce a rule that spending must serve the general welfare will be
quite indeterminate and will require courts to make what will look
like naked policy decisions.
Consider federal education funding to the states. One might
71
readily agree that education serves the general welfare, but how
ought Congress allocate funds? Congress might give each state the
same amount per child in a public school, but states with large urban
areas—where children require more expensive educational
72
interventions —might legitimately complain that such an allocation
unduly subsidizes states without large urban areas. But if Congress
were to give more money per student to states with large urban areas,
states without those areas might legitimately complain that the
73
program favored “particular regions or states.” To decide which of
these complaints is correct (if either) requires a substantive theory
about how education funds should be allocated across the states. But
any such theory will be normatively contestable and will raise the
question why the courts instead of Congress should be the ones to

good overview of the theories of regulation that derived from or reacted to post-war pluralism,
see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31–86 (1998).
69. See Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, 44–48 (1991).
70. See id. at 49–59.
71. Or not. Education funding, one might say, is for the “special” welfare of children,
parents, and teachers.
72. See Andrew Reschovsky & Jennifer Imazeki, Let No Child Be Left Behind:
Determining the Cost of Improving Student Performance, 31 PUB. FIN. REV. 263, 265 (2003).
73. Eastman, supra note 59, at 65.
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decide which of several plausible substantive theories of fairness is
the correct one.
Even if we could agree on the correct substantive theory of
fairness, determining whether a spending program is unfair under that
theory will often depend on the level of abstraction at which the
74
program is described. Consider a different education-funding
example. Congress has allocated special funding to the states to
75
educate the children of migrant agricultural workers. That funding is
targeted at places with large concentrations of migrant agricultural
workers, but it is part of a package of funding that provides for the
educational needs of students across the country. Does the federal
Migrant Education Program serve “the ‘general’ welfare” or “the
76
special welfare of particular regions or states”? It all depends on the
level of abstraction at which one considers the program at issue, and
the notion of “general welfare” does not tell us which level of
abstraction is appropriate.
The problem exists even when one considers stand-alone
appropriations. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Congress passed a
77
law that gave relief to the affected areas. That law served the special
78
welfare of particular regions or states. But it could also be seen to
serve the “general” welfare in at least three ways. First, the massive

74. To be sure, the “levels-of-abstraction problem” is common in constitutional
adjudication, Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084–85 (1981); see also Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1372–73 (1984) (making the same point),
and it arises especially frequently when applying theories of equal treatment. For an example
from the disability law context, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114
YALE L.J. 1, 45–50 (2004).
75. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-110, tit. I, pt. C, 115 Stat. 1425,
1571–80 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6391–99 (2006)).
76. Eastman, supra note 59, at 65.
77. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico and Pandemic Influenza, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. B, 119 Stat. 2680, 2745–82
(2005).
78. Cf. Eastman, supra note 59, at 79 (stating that “the Fourth Congress did not even
believe it had the power to provide relief to the citizens of Savannah, Georgia after a
devastating fire destroyed the entire city,” because such an appropriation was not for the
“general” welfare). There is reason to doubt Professor Eastman’s account of the original
understanding. As Professor Michele (Landis) Dauber has shown, the federal government
frequently provided disaster relief in the early republic; although constitutional limitations were
sometimes asserted in opposition to disaster relief bills in Congress, concerns about sectional
fairness and the sympathy for particular disaster victims were far more important. See Michele
L. Landis, “Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the
American Welfare State 1789–1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 998–1027 (1998).
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dislocation occasioned by the hurricanes affected the nationwide
economy. Second, there is no reason to expect that the same relief
would be withheld from any other states or regions of the country if
they were to experience a comparable disaster; a government that
generally gives relief to regions that experience disasters acts in the
general welfare whenever it grants such relief. And third, people
across the nation felt a sympathetic bond with their fellow Americans;
granting relief to the victims of Katrina and Rita increased the
welfare of people throughout the country by reaffirming their
79
psychically valuable bonds of citizenship.
Professor Eastman’s own examples show that reliance on the
notion of a general welfare requires formalistic distinctions that do
not hold up analytically. For example, Eastman cites with approval
the antebellum practice of allowing federal funding of “navigational
improvements below ports of entry” but not allowing internal
80
“improvements beyond that line.” Thus, “[a]t the same time it was
denying a request to fund the dredging of the Savannah River,”
Congress “approved an appropriation for a lighthouse at the entrance
81
of the Chesapeake Bay.” The distinction between the two cases,
which Eastman endorses, is that “the lighthouse was of benefit to the
entire coastal trade, while the dredging operation was primarily of
82
benefit to the people of Georgia.” But, the Chesapeake Bay
lighthouse was primarily of benefit not to the entire coastal trade but
to the mid-Atlantic coastal trade. The benefits to the coastal trade in
New England, New York, and the South (where Savannah was one of
the most significant ports) were far less significant. And the Savannah
River, which forms the border between South Carolina and Georgia,
provided the interior areas of those states with access to the ocean.
Facilitating shipping entering into the country at Savannah is just as

79. One might object that the last of these is not really about the “general welfare.” But
that objection rests on the contestable normative view that economic welfare is the only kind of
welfare that is relevant under the spending power. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 69, at 49–59
(emphasizing that wealth maximization (that is, economic efficiency) is not the only normative
standard that can be used as a baseline for assessing the desirability of a law). For what it’s
worth, the Supreme Court has long held that the power to spend for the general welfare
includes the power to spend to satisfy purely moral obligations. See Dauber, supra note 51, at
453–56.
80. Id. at 84. In Professor Eastman’s account, Congress typically adhered to this line, but
not always. Id. at 81.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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much a matter for the general welfare as facilitating shipping entering
into the country at Baltimore.
It was not the “generality” of the benefit conferred that
distinguished the Chesapeake Bay lighthouse from the Savannah
River dredging. What distinguished the two cases was an entirely
independent notion that the federal government was properly
concerned with “external” but not “internal” improvements to
navigation. But I doubt the modern Court is inclined to rest its
Spending Clause doctrine on such formalist notions of the proper
sphere of federal power. Conservative Justices attempted to create
83
84
such a doctrine during the National League of Cities v. Usery era,
85
but the Court ultimately abandoned the task as unworkable. Even
when what many understood to be a pro-states’-rights majority took
over in the late Rehnquist era, the Court passed up a clear
86
opportunity to revive such a formalist doctrine.

83. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
84. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538–40 (citing cases in which the Supreme Court and lower
courts attempted to delineate a protected sphere of state government activity by looking to what
were “traditional” and “integral” state functions).
85. The Court identified several problems with focusing on formal distinctions in the state
immunity context:
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule
of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether
a particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional.” Any such rule leads
to inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic selfgovernance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those
principles.
Id. at 546–47.
86. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (agreeing that the enactment of the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act “is a proper exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause,” without consideration of whether it
constitutes an “integral” or “traditional” government function). In its Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, the Court has continued to invoke the concept, seemingly discredited in
Garcia, of “traditional government functions.” See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct.
1801, 1811 (2008) (upholding Kentucky law exempting interest on municipal bonds issued by the
state or its subdivisions, but not interest on municipal bonds issued by other states or their
subdivisions, from state taxation, and explaining that the contrary ruling would properly spark
“apprehension . . . about ‘unprecedented . . . interference’ with a traditional government
function” (second alteration in original) (quoting United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007))). I do not think that Davis, which
declined to invalidate “a century-old taxing practice, presently employed by 41 States, and
affirmatively supported by all of them,” id. (citations omitted), suggests that the Court will be
comfortable employing formalist notions of traditional state functions to invalidate federal
spending legislation. For those who are of a mind to avoid the so-called mistake of Lochner,
there is a big difference between upholding and invalidating a democratically enacted statute.
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No spending legislation affects all regions in exactly the same
way, and all spending legislation could be seen as benefiting the
people more generally. To decide what spending serves the general
welfare requires a normative theory independent of the concept of
generality—a normative theory of what substantive areas of policy
Congress should be entering. I predict that conservative judges will
see that kind of inquiry as coming so close to Lochner that they will
avoid embarking on it.
2. Nexus
a. The Promise of the Nexus Requirement. One might think that
the nexus requirement could provide a meaningful limitation on
Congress’s power to attach conditions to federal grants. Nexus
requirements are well established in land-use and takings law—and in
unconstitutional conditions law more generally—so courts have a
body of precedent from which they can draw analogies in spending
87
power cases. And unlike the general welfare limitation, which seems
to require policy judgments that, placed in the hands of courts, are
Lochneresque, the nexus requirement takes Congress at its word
88
regarding the purpose of the federal outlay. By asking whether the
condition imposed by Congress is sufficiently closely related to
Congress’s own articulated purpose in spending federal funds, the
nexus requirement seems to impose nothing more than the sort of
pretext analysis that is commonplace in assessments of federal
89
power.
A number of prominent commentators seem to believe that the
nexus requirement has the potential to impose meaningful constraints
on Congress’s exercise of the conditional spending power. Professor
Jonathan Adler contends that the Clean Air Act violates the nexus
requirement because it withholds federal highway funds from states
that fail to submit an adequate plan for limiting emissions—including

87. On nexus requirements in land-use law, see Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a
Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 741–45
(2007). On the nexus requirement in unconstitutional conditions law generally, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1456–76 (1989).
88. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987) (“Our cases have not
required that we define the outer bounds of the ‘germaneness’ or ‘relatedness’ limitation on the
imposition of conditions under the spending power.”).
89. On the importance of pretext analysis to assessments of federal power, see J. Randy
Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End Relationships, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 407, 408–11 (2003).
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90

emissions from stationary sources. And Professor Lynn Baker
contends that 23 U.S.C. § 409, which the Supreme Court upheld on
91
Commerce Clause grounds in Pierce County v. Guillen, would have
violated the Dole nexus test as well: by conditioning federal highway
safety funds on state courts’ recognition of an evidentiary privilege in
government documents compiled or collected for the purpose of
identifying hazards on the roads—even if they were documents like
ordinary police reports that were not generated for the purpose of
identifying such hazards—the statute imposes a condition that does
92
not serve the federal interest in highway safety.
The decided cases offer at least some reason to believe that the
nexus requirement is a more likely source of limits on the conditional
spending power than is the general welfare requirement. Unlike with
the general welfare requirement, leading jurists have invoked the
nexus requirement on occasion as a ground for invalidating
conditional spending legislation. In Dole, Justice O’Connor
contended that Congress violated that requirement by conditioning a
state’s receipt of certain federal highway funds on the adoption of a
93
twenty-one-year-old drinking age. The solicitor general had argued
that the imposition of a drinking age related directly to the federal
interest in constructing safe highways (by reducing drunk driving),
but Justice O’Connor found the condition “far too over and underinclusive”—most teen drinkers don’t drive drunk, and most drunk
94
drivers aren’t teenagers. She concluded that a requirement imposed
on states as a condition on federal spending is valid only if “the
requirement specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so
95
that Congress’ intent in making the grant will be effectuated” :
When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled
to insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist
as a condition of the use of highway funds that the State impose or
change regulations in other areas of the State’s social and economic
life because of an attenuated or tangential relationship to highway

90. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 447–52 (2005).
91. Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003).
92. See Lynn A. Baker, Lochner’s Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County v. Guillen
as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 750–51 (2005).
93. Dole, 483 U.S. at 213–14 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 214.
95. Id. at 216 (quoting Brief of the National Conference of State Legislators et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19–20, Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (No. 86-260)).
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96

use or safety.

Were it otherwise, she argued, “Congress could effectively regulate
almost any area of a State’s social, political, or economic life on the
theory that use of the interstate transportation system is somehow
97
enhanced.” A panel of the Eighth Circuit applied a similar analysis
in holding that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which
prohibits recipients of federal funding from discriminating on the
98
99
basis of disability, exceeded Congress’s spending power.
But Justice O’Connor spoke in dissent in Dole, and the Eighth
Circuit went en banc and overturned the panel decision invalidating
Section 504. And that should not be surprising. For two basic reasons,
which I discuss in the next two subsections, courts are unlikely to use
the nexus requirement to impose a meaningful limitation on
Congress’s power to attach conditions to federal spending.
b. The Specter of Lochner. First, contrary to what appears at first
glance, stringent application of the nexus requirement will indeed
often require courts to make the sorts of policy judgments that
conservative judges are likely to consider Lochneresque. Consider
Justice O’Connor’s discussion of the over- and underinclusiveness of
the drinking-age condition in Dole. Because legislation can rarely if
ever achieve its purposes with precision, most if not all laws are overand underinclusive to some degree. And there is no obvious and
nonarbitrary standard for determining how well a statute must
achieve its asserted purposes. With the New Deal reaction to Lochner
100
still dominant among conservative judges, it is difficult to explain
why courts, rather than legislators, should be the ones to decide
101
whether a statute is sufficiently effective to remain the law.
96. Id. at 215.
97. Id.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
99. See Bradley v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 757 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Arkansas is
forced to renounce all federal funding, including funding wholly unrelated to the RA, if it does
not want to comply with § 504.”), rev’d en banc sub nom. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079
(8th Cir. 2000); see also Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1171–75
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing that Section 504 violates the nexus
requirement).
100. See supra note 66.
101. Conservative judges are happy to look for over- and underinclusiveness in cases
involving so-called heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2755–58 (2007) (plurality opinion). But in those cases they do not
look for tightness of means-ends fit for its own sake; rather, they do so either as a way to ensure
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Professor Baker’s argument for the unconstitutionality of 23
U.S.C. § 409 illustrates the problem. Baker contends that attaching an
evidentiary privilege to information compiled or collected for the
purpose of identifying hazards on roads did not serve the interest in
highway safety that animated the underlying spending program. The
government argued, plausibly, that such a privilege will encourage
localities to make efforts to identify hazards on roads—without such a
privilege, localities might fear that their efforts would actually
increase their tort exposure by generating evidence that plaintiffs
could use to prove negligence. Baker agrees that an evidentiary
privilege limited to documents originally generated for purposes of
identifying roadway hazards might well serve the interest in highway
safety in this way. But she contends that an evidentiary privilege for
information that was merely compiled or collected for purposes of
identifying roadway hazards—even if a locality generated the
information wholly independently of such an effort—gives localities
more tort immunity than is necessary to incentivize them to
participate in the hazard-identification program. By reducing
localities’ tort exposure without encouraging localities to participate
in the hazard identification program, Baker argues, § 409 actually
102
disserves the interest in highway safety.
Professor Baker’s argument is plausible. But the opposite
argument is at least as plausible. A privilege for all information
compiled or collected in the hazard-identification program might well
be necessary to encourage localities to participate if those localities
are risk averse. And Congress might well conclude that the additional
increment of effective tort immunity caused by the broader privilege
would not meaningfully reduce localities’ incentives to take care.
Such a conclusion might be based, for example, on doubts about the
103
(positive) deterrent effect of tort liability in general.

that especially protected interests are not lightly infringed or as a way to smoke out illegitimate
intent. See Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 62–63 (1997). But the conservative
Justices have not shown any especial desire to impose a general requirement of tight meansends fit. For a unanimous example of the Court’s deferential approach that highlights the
difficulties of a general requirement of tight means-ends fit, see Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of
Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003).
102. See Baker, supra note 92, at 750–51.
103. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Second-Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 517, 524–35 (2006) (showing that tort liability can alter defendants’ behavior without
reducing risk and harm of accidents); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of
Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 390, 443, 390–422 (1994)
(reviewing the literature concerning whether “tort law, in its various branches, achieves
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To decide which of these opposing stories is correct requires an
analysis of the available empirical evidence, as well as a more finegrained theory of local government incentives. Professor Baker
provides neither. More importantly, for a court to decide which of
these opposing stories is correct would necessarily require it baldly to
second-guess Congress’s resolution of these empirical questions
regarding how municipalities will respond to the law. As Professor
Larry Yackle has said, this sort of nexus analysis looks a lot like
104
“Lochner resurgent in another place,” and courts are likely to see it
as such.
c. Analytic Emptiness. There is a second, more fundamental,
reason why the courts are unlikely to employ the nexus requirement
to impose meaningful limits on Congress’s conditional spending
authority: as a purely analytic matter, that requirement imposes no
limitation at all on Congress’s power to attach conditions to federal
spending. That is because “germaneness theories founder on the
extreme malleability of the concept of germaneness itself.
Germaneness to the purpose of a benefit depends crucially on how
105
broadly or narrowly that purpose is defined.” Since United States v.
106
Butler adopted the so-called Hamiltonian position on Congress’s
spending authority (although the Court did not appear to heed that
position in its bottom-line holding invalidating the Agricultural
107
Adjustment Act), it has been settled law that Congress can spend
for any otherwise constitutional purpose it wishes; Congress is not
108
limited to spending in aid of the other enumerated Article I powers.
The condition imposed by Congress can therefore always be
characterized as part of the purpose of a piece of conditional

anything by way of deterrence” and concluding that “while not as effective as economic models
suggest, [tort law] may still be somewhat successful in achieving its stated deterrence goals”).
104. Yackle, supra note 64, at 779.
105. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1474.
106. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
107. Id. at 65–66.
108. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987). In his major article on the
spending power, Professor David Engdahl argues that “this kind of ‘germaneness’ requirement
assumes the anti-Hamiltonian premise that spending is permissible only for certain specified
ends.” Engdahl, supra note 34, at 57–58. I do not think that is quite true. As the discussion in the
text shows, the nexus requirement does not impose any meaningful constraint once one accepts
the Hamiltonian view adopted in Butler and Dole, but the requirement does not presuppose the
rejection of that view.
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spending legislation. Dole’s nexus requirement, therefore, “is
109
vacuous.”
There is no requirement that federal spending have a single
purpose, and both common sense and a basic understanding of
politics reveal that federal funding legislation (like any legislation)
110
typically has multiple purposes. A senator may vote for farm
subsidies to protect family farmers and stabilize rural communities, to
distribute wealth to agribusiness, to bolster the senator’s presidential
prospects (with the Iowa caucuses in mind), or as part of a deal to
111
ensure the passage of food stamp legislation. Highway subsidies,
even without the condition upheld in Dole, serve at least the purposes
of facilitating commerce, employing construction workers, and
bolstering labor unions. When Congress gives states money to build
highways on the condition that they raise their drinking ages to
twenty-one, that program serves all of the purposes that highway
subsidies in general serve, plus the additional purpose of encouraging
states to raise their drinking ages by giving them a valuable benefit in
exchange for their doing so. By definition, then, the drinking-age

109. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 105. The Court has applied a form of nexus analysis
to hold that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted a California law that barred
recipients of state funds from using those funds to assist or deter union organizing. See Chamber
of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2414–16 (2008). But unlike in the Spending Clause
context, in which Congress can generally spend for any purpose it likes, the NLRA limits state
conduct—including spending—that the Court finds to have too great an effect on areas the
statute leaves to the “free play of economic forces.” Id. at 2412 (quoting Machinists v. Wis.
Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976)). Although Chamber of Commerce
could provide a template for stringent nexus review under the Spending Clause, the significant
difference in context—and the fact that the Court has never invalidated a federal spending
statute for having an insufficient nexus—suggests that the Justices might well see things
differently under the Spending Clause.
110. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 335 (1990) (“The complex compromises endemic in
the political process suggest that legislation is frequently a congeries of different and sometimes
conflicting purposes. To be enacted, a statute must be acceptable to a range of interest groups,
each of which will have their own reasons for supporting, or at least not opposing, the statute.”).
For judicial recognition of this point, see Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103,
108 (2003).
111. See John Ferejohn, Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp
Legislation, in CONGRESS AND POLICY CHANGE 223, 231–45 (Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N.
Rieselbach & Lawrence C. Dodd eds., 1986) (explaining that urban Democrats voted for farm
legislation in exchange for Republican support for food stamp legislation); David A. Super, The
Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996
Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1383 n.480 (2004).
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condition is directly related to “the federal interest” in the highway
112
funding program.
Similarly, when Congress imposes a cross-cutting condition like
Section 504, which provides that states that receive federal funds for
any of their operations must refrain from disability discrimination in
113
all of their operations, the nexus requirement is readily satisfied.
After Congress imposes such a condition, any new federal grant takes
on at least two purposes: (a) subsidizing whatever activity the grant
pays for (highway construction, public education, and so on) and
whatever additional purposes that subsidy serves, and (b)
encouraging the state to refrain from disability discrimination in all of
its operations by providing the state a valuable benefit in exchange.
As the Third Circuit has explained, Section 504 “expresse[s] a clear
interest in eliminating disability-based discrimination in state
departments or agencies,” an interest that “flows with every dollar
114
spent by a department or agency receiving federal funds.”
d. Justice O’Connor’s Variant.
Even Justice O’Connor’s
seemingly narrow view of the conditional spending power, which
Professor David Engdahl calls the “harshest” variety of nexus
115
requirement,
imposes no meaningful limits. In Dole, Justice
O’Connor argued that “Congress has no power under the Spending
Clause to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying

112. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2006).
114. Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2002). One scholarly treatment
suggests that Section 504 violates the nexus requirement. See Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony
Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights:
How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1137–42 (2001). But
Professors Berman, Reese, and Young do not explain why encouraging the state not to
discriminate cannot be a valid purpose of federal spending legislation. The dissenting appellate
opinions that have argued that Section 504 violates the nexus requirement have the same
problem. See Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Sentelle, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[t]he purpose of the federal funds WMATA receives is
to subsidize the mass-transit services WMATA provides” without explaining why federal funds
cannot have multiple purposes); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (Bowman, J., dissenting) (“Here, the condition (waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity with respect to Rehabilitation Act claims) bears no direct relationship (indeed, not
even a discernible relationship) to the purpose of most federal grants to the states for education.
That purpose, broadly stated, is to improve the overall quality of education.”).
115. Engdahl, supra note 34, at 56.
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116

how the money should be spent.” Engdahl contends that under such
a rule, “scarcely any conditions could be imposed except those
117
designating authorized uses or specifying accounting methods.” But
“specifying how the money should be spent” seems to reach further
than that. As Engdahl’s reference to “accounting methods” suggests,
Congress is “specifying how the money should be spent” when it
requires federal funding recipients to adopt controls to ensure that
118
the money is not stolen or wasted. When Congress imposes such a
requirement, it is effectively saying, “Spend this money (for highways,
schools, or whatever) through a process that avoids theft or waste.”
But that analysis would permit Congress to do far more than
impose accounting methods. As Justice O’Connor recognized, it
would also permit Congress to require state employees who worked
on federally funded programs to refrain from partisan political
119
activity. Indeed, when the Court upheld the Hatch Act provision
that imposed that very requirement, it recognized—in O’Connor-like
language—that the provision represented the exercise of Congress’s
“power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states
120
shall be disbursed.” In particular, Congress sought to ensure “better
public service” in federally funded programs “by requiring those who
administer funds for national needs to abstain from active political
121
partisanship.” Justice O’Connor endorsed the Court’s decision to
uphold the Hatch Act, a statute she believed was “appropriately
viewed as a condition relating to how federal moneys were to be
122
expended.”
If the Hatch Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to specify
how its funds are to be expended, then it is difficult to see how Justice
O’Connor’s supposedly “harsh” view imposes any real limitation on
conditional spending. In requiring the members of the Oklahoma
Highway Commission to refrain from partisan political activity,
Congress did not tell the state where or on what to spend federal

116. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of the National
Conference of State Legislators et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 95, at
19–20).
117. Engdahl, supra note 34, at 57.
118. The statute the Court upheld in Sabri—18 U.S.C. § 666—is an example of the point. See
supra text accompanying notes 16–18.
119. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
120. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
121. Id.
122. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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money. Congress simply declared that federal money must be spent in
a context that is free from the kind of “active political partisanship”
that may prevent the state from accomplishing the federal program’s
123
purpose. By parity of analysis, Congress could require states to keep
all items purchased with federal financial assistance in a secure,
fenced-in area that is guarded by a police patrol. Congress would be
specifying how its money was spent—“Don’t buy anything unless you
have a secure, fenced-in area with police patrol to put it in”—and it
would be doing so to ensure its money was not wasted. Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, which effectively tells states that they must
spend federal money in a context that is free from disability
124
125
discrimination, would be constitutional on a similar analysis.
But, in almost exactly the same way, the condition in Dole itself
could readily be characterized as merely specifying how federal
highway funds were spent. As Justice O’Connor acknowledged in her
dissent, “[w]hen Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it
126
is entitled to insist that the highway be a safe one.” By requiring
states that receive the full measure of federal highway funds to raise
their drinking ages to twenty-one, Congress could be characterized as
simply telling those states that they may spend those funds only in
conditions that Congress believes conducive to safety on the highways
they build. If the Hatch Act merely specified how federal money
should be spent, the Dole statute did the same thing.
The above discussion should demonstrate that Professor Engdahl
was wrong to argue that “any time the notion of a germaneness
requirement is even taken seriously it puts Hamilton and his view of
127
the spending power out of reach.” If anything, the opposite is true:
123. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
125. I don’t think it particularly matters for these purposes that Section 504’s requirements
extend to “all of the operations of” a government entity, “any part of which” receives federal
funding. Id. § 794(b). Congress might legitimately think that proven discrimination in one part
of a federally funded entity is evidence of discrimination in other parts that more directly
receive federal funds. Or Congress may simply understand that “[m]oney is fungible,” Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 606 (2004), so that federal funding of one part of a governmental
entity will end up financing (and perhaps subsidizing) discrimination in another part of that
entity, see id. On the fungibility of money in state budgets, see David Super, Rethinking Fiscal
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2561 (2005).
126. Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
127. Engdahl, supra note 34, at 62. In a footnote to an article published over a dozen years
after his major spending power article, Professor Engdahl seems to have recognized the point
(without acknowledging his prior position). See David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the
Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496, 496 n.3 (2007) (“[A]dding any condition(s) to a
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once one accepts the Hamiltonian view that Congress’s spending
power is not limited by the other Article I powers, the nexus
requirement is unlikely to impose a meaningful limit on Congress’s
imposition of conditions on spending.
3. Coercion
a. The Problems with the Traditional Coercion Doctrine. Nor is
the coercion doctrine likely to impose meaningful limits on the
conditional spending power. As two leading scholars have observed,
“the lower courts have consistently failed to find impermissible
coercion, even when a state has demonstrated that either the absolute
amount or percentage of federal money at stake is so large that it has
‘no choice but to accept the [federal legislation’s] many
128
requirements.’” Since the Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in United
States v. Butler, the closest any court has come to invalidating
conditional spending legislation on coercion grounds has been the
Fourth Circuit’s 1997 en banc decision in Virginia Department of
129
Education v. Riley. In Riley, six judges concluded that the federal
government’s withholding of funds to Virginia under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act raised a serious question of coercion
because “the Federal Government has withheld from the
Commonwealth 100% of an annual special education grant of $60
million because of the Commonwealth’s failure to provide private
educational services to less than one-tenth of one percent (126) of the
128,000 handicapped students for whom the special education funds
130
were earmarked.” But those six judges did not constitute a majority,
and they were unwilling to hold that the withholding of funds actually
131
crossed the coercion line in any event.
As with the nexus doctrine, it is easy to see why the coercion
doctrine has proven ineffective as a limit on Congress’s power to
attach conditions to grants of federal funds to states. The basic
problem is well rehearsed in the literature: Determinations that a
grant adds ipso facto to the purpose(s) of that grant, so that ‘unrelated’ conditions are logically
impossible.”).
128. Baker & Berman, supra note 3, at 468–69 (quoting Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d
1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000)).
129. Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam).
130. Id. at 569 (quoting Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1355 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Luttig, J., dissenting)). The majority en banc opinion adopted in whole and reprinted Judge
Luttig’s dissenting panel opinion.
131. See id. (reserving the question).
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conditional offer of federal funds coerces the states tend to depend on
normatively contestable premises about states’ baseline entitlement
132
to federal largesse. Such premises are “especially problematic”
when considered “against the backdrop of a constitutional
jurisprudence in which most redistribution is permissible and few
133
affirmative obligations on government are imposed.” No less a
conservative luminary than Justice Scalia has declared, in an opinion
for the Court, that “Congress has no obligation to use its Spending
134
Clause power to disburse funds to the States; such funds are gifts.”
As Professor Kathleen Sullivan has explained, “[t]o hold that
conditions coerce recipients because they make them worse off with
respect to a benefit than they ought to be runs against the ground
rules of the negative Constitution on which the unconstitutional
135
conditions problem rests.”
As a number of commentators have shown, this problem has
doomed efforts by such prominent scholars as Professors Richard
Epstein and Seth Kreimer to articulate baselines that would give
136
meaning to the coercion inquiry in conditional-offer cases. And
even opponents of lax review of conditional spending such as

132. My discussion in this paragraph glosses over lots of nuances in the literature, but those
nuances do not detract from the basic point. For illuminating discussions of coercion, see
generally Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440, 440–72 (Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton
White eds., 1969); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). For good discussions of the
problems, see generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 77–90 (1996); Larry Alexander,
Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
175 (1989); Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1442–54.
133. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1450.
134. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686–87
(1999).
135. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1450. My point is not to endorse the notion of the “Negative
Constitution,” Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271,
2273 (1990) (criticizing the assumption underlying a “Negative Constitution” and proposing that
scholars discard the rhetoric of negative rights), but merely to observe that it is a notion to
which conservative judges strongly adhere.
136. For a good instantiation of Epstein’s effort, see generally RICHARD EPSTEIN,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993). For Kreimer’s effort, see Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352–78
(1984). For discussions of the problems with these efforts, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 13–14
(2001); Louis Michael Seidman, Essay, Reflections on Context and the Constitution, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 73, 78–80 (1988); sources cited supra note 132. Indeed, even Professor Kreimer himself
appears to acknowledge that his approach has only limited traction—if that—in practice. See
Adler & Kreimer, supra note 109, at 91–92.
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Professors Lynn Baker and Mitchell Berman concede that it is
“unlikely” that courts will adopt a test that “provid[es] that a
spending condition is impermissibly coercive if it presents a state with
137
either no rational choice or no fair choice but to accept.” The “norational-choice and no-fair-choice constructions of impermissible
coercion,” they assert, “are just too amorphous to be judicially
138
administrable.” (This is just another way of saying that under the
negative Constitution there is no ready way to determine that the
federal government’s withholding of largesse to the states denies
them a “fair” choice to refuse the federal government’s condition.)
But both Professors Baker and Berman have offered their own
refinements of the coercion test—refinements that they believe would
avoid these difficulties. Neither refinement solves the problem,
however.
b. The Problems with Professor Baker’s Refinement. When
Congress uses its spending authority to impose conditions on states
that it could not mandate under its other Article I powers, Professor
Baker proposes that courts treat the conditions as coercive unless the
conditional spending law is “reimbursement spending” legislation—a
law that “specifies the purpose for which the states are to spend the
offered federal funds and simply reimburses the states, in whole or in
139
part, for their expenditures for that purpose.” She reasons that
federal offers to states are inherently coercive, because, in her words,
“the federal government has a monopoly power over the various
140
sources of state revenue.” In particular, she contends, federal
revenue essentially comes directly out of the states’ pockets—the
federal government has plenary power to tax the income of state
residents, and every dollar of tax collected by the federal government
is a dollar of potential revenue that the state cannot get its hands
141
on. “Thus, when the federal government offers the states money, it
can be understood as simply offering to return the states’ money to
142
them, often with unattractive conditions attached.”

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Baker & Berman, supra note 3, at 521.
Id.
Baker, supra note 3, at 1916 & n.16.
Id. at 1935.
Id. at 1937.
Id.
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Although this analysis would seem to make any exercise of the
conditional spending power coercive, Professor Baker is particularly
concerned with the prospect that a majority of states will impose their
policy preferences on outlier states by securing the passage of
143
conditional spending legislation. She gives the example of the death
penalty: most states have adopted capital punishment in their criminal
justice systems, but those states might someday conclude that they are
losing highly educated and mobile workers (who may be less likely to
144
support capital punishment) to states with no death penalty. “But if
Congress is permitted to offer the states federal funds on the
condition that they make the death penalty available for first degree
murder convictions,” Baker contends, “a simple majority of states will
be able to harness the federal lawmaking power to restrict the
competition for residents and tax dollars that would otherwise exist
145
among them.”
Professor Baker’s reimbursement-spending rule is designed to
prevent this situation. Baker illustrates the point, again, with a death
penalty example. She contrasts a hypothetical statute that offers
“federal Death Penalty Funds” to reimburse states for “their
demonstrated cost of executing those sentenced to death for first
degree murder” with another hypothetical statute that gives states
money apportioned on a population basis “to provide ‘beat cops’” for
urban neighborhoods on the condition that receiving states “hav[e]
146
the death penalty available for first degree murder convictions.”
Although both of these statutes “provide states an incentive to make
the death penalty available,” Baker contends that the former statute
would be “surely preferable” for a state that “preferred not to have
147
the death penalty.” Such a state would give up federal funds for the
143. See id. at 1942.
144. See id. at 1947–48. Professor Baker uses this example as part of an effort to show that
liberals, as well as conservatives, have something to fear from broad conditional spending
authority—a point that Baker has frequently made in her work on federalism. See, e.g., Lynn A.
Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 442 (2002) (arguing that
liberals should favor the judicial enforcement of states’ rights). But it all depends on your risk
tolerance. To be sure, conditional spending could be used to support conservative legislation—
which is one reason why, I explain in Section B, conservative Justices are unlikely to impose
significant limitations on that tool. But a liberal who believes in activist government might
reasonably conclude that the risk of some bad legislation is worth it for the prospect of enacting
some good legislation. It is not hard to see why a liberal might think that Medicaid is worth the
Solomon Amendment, for example.
145. Baker, supra note 3, at 1948.
146. Id. at 1967–68.
147. Id. at 1969.
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death penalty—but those funds would not be especially tempting for
a state that did not want to have the death penalty in the first place.
But the latter statute imposes an additional cost on noncomplying
states by requiring them to give up federal funds for activities that
they do undertake—an additional cost that makes the law “especially
148
likely to induce otherwise reluctant states to comply.”
It seems to me quite unlikely that the courts will adopt Professor
Baker’s proposal. For one thing, the proposal rests on a notion of
coercion that falls prey to the same baseline problems I discussed in
this Section. Baker articulates a clear baseline against which to
measure coercion: when the federal government spends, it is really
149
spending “the states’ money,” so the states are entitled to receive
federal assistance in proportion to their share of the federal tax base.
But the notion that the federal government has an affirmative
obligation to give financial assistance to the states, no less than the
baselines proposed by earlier scholars, “runs against the ground rules
150
of the negative Constitution.” As a matter of empirical public
finance, it is doubtful that federal taxation, particularly at early
twenty-first century levels, imposes significant practical limits on
151
states’ ability to raise revenue from their residents. And as a
normative matter, the notion that federal tax revenues are really “the
states’ money” seems to pervert the (already perverse) libertarian
dictum that taxation is theft. In Baker’s view, federal taxation is
theft—not from the taxpayers, but from the states (who are really
entitled to the revenues). But there is no normative reason to think of

148. Id. at 1970.
149. Id. at 1937.
150. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1450; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686–87 (1999) (“Congress has no obligation to use its
Spending Clause power to disburse funds to the States; such funds are gifts.”).
151. See Galle, supra note 34, at 190 & n.221 (noting that federal taxation, by avoiding
states’ collective action problems, “is able to tap a large base of revenue unavailable to the
states,” that “Professor Baker offers no evidence that federal tax levels, either now or at any
time in history, have been so high that they have exceeded this base,” and that “the
conventional wisdom is that state and federal tax levels rise and fall together”); Super, supra
note 125, at 2561 (“[B]ecause states have broad revenue-raising powers on their own and large,
diversified budgets, a failure to provide fiscal assistance—a disinterest in federalism—does not
necessarily prevent states from acting unilaterally. Because a state can raise another tax when
one is struck down or can cut another program when federal mandates make one more
expensive, federal policies do not directly constrain the broader scope of states’
policymaking.”). But cf. id. at 2593 (“Congress and the Court have been weakening states’ fiscal
positions by hobbling states’ revenue-raising capacities in ways difficult to reconcile with both
institutions’ strong pro-state rhetoric . . . .”).
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the states as really entitled to the revenues collected by the federal
government. One could much more plausibly argue that adoption of
the Sixteenth Amendment reflects the view that the federal
government has, and ought to have, the first claim on the tax base.
Moreover, Professor Baker’s reimbursement-spending rule is not
well tailored to address her concern that majority states are using
conditional spending legislation to induce outliers to bring their
policies into line with the majority. To return to Baker’s two
hypothetical death penalty statutes, it is far from clear that a state that
opposed capital punishment would prefer the reimbursementspending law (that provided states funds to pay for death penalty
prosecutions) to the regulatory spending law (that conditioned funds
for beat cops on the state’s adoption of capital punishment). If one
accepts Baker’s premise that the federal government is spending “the
states’ money,” then a state without capital punishment can easily see
the reimbursement-spending law as one that gives pro-death-penalty
states a competitive advantage by paying for some of their capital
punishment costs and thus freeing up money to spend on other
worthy projects. The reimbursement-spending law takes
noncomplying states’ money, but it gives them nothing in return.
The law that conditions funds for beat cops on a state’s adoption
of capital punishment, by contrast, might be welcomed by a state
without the death penalty. Such a law might well effect a positive-sum
transaction between the states. The states that want capital
punishment throughout the nation can achieve that goal, but only if
they pay the holdout price of the states that do not have the death
penalty. Receipt of that holdout price would, by definition, permit
states that do not have the death penalty to trade their abolitionism
152
for resources that will pay for projects that matter more to them.
Baker rests her arguments on the view that prohibiting “regulatory
153
spending” enhances social welfare, but it is hard to see how social

152. See Galle, supra note 34, at 186–87 (“[M]inority states will recognize that they can
obtain holdout costs from the majority.”). For an excellent discussion of the point, see Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes
Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 871–91 (1998).
153. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 1935 (“[F]ederal regulatory spending is especially
likely to reduce aggregate social welfare by reducing the diversity among the states in the
package of taxes and services, including state constitutional rights and other laws, that each
offers to its residents and potential residents.”). I follow, without passing judgment on,
Professor Baker’s treatment of states as unitary actors with relatively stable sets of preferences.

BAGENSTOS IN FINAL2.DOC

378

11/16/2008 9:58:47 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:345
154

welfare is enhanced by blocking that transaction. It is especially
hard to see why a state without the death penalty would prefer that
“its” money subsidize other states’ capital punishment systems.
c. The Problems with Professor Berman’s Refinement. Professor
Berman argues that we can avoid the baseline problem altogether by
adopting a theory of coercion that does not take the states’ baseline
entitlements as a starting point. Instead, he argues that a conditional
offer of federal spending is “coercive for purposes of constitutional
law—hence presumptively unconstitutional—if it would violate the
Constitution for the [federal government] to carry out its threat” to
155
withhold funds. But that formulation hardly solves the problem.
The doctrine looks to coercion as a way of determining whether a
piece of conditional spending legislation violates the Constitution; to
say that a piece of conditional spending legislation is coercive
whenever its embedded threat violates the Constitution simply brings
the argument full circle.
Recognizing that point, Professor Berman proposes that it would
violate the Constitution for the federal government to withhold
federal funds as a penalty for a state’s exercise of its Tenth
156
Amendment rights. But even that formulation does not solve the
problem because we need to know what a penalty is. Berman’s
definition of the term is exceptionally broad: “a ‘penalty’ exists when
the [government] imposes a burden for the purpose of discouraging
157
or punishing assertion of a protected right.” Because the Tenth
Amendment gives states a “protected right” to do anything that is
constitutional and is not preempted by valid federal legislation, and
because encouragement is the flip side of discouragement, Berman
treats a federal funding condition as imposing a penalty whenever the
158
law has the purpose of “influencing the states’ behavior.”

154. See Super, supra note 125, at 2583–84. Professor Super argues,
In effect, then, disallowing federal conditions on grants to states would be tantamount
to denying states the ability to contract to perform services for the federal
government. Whatever problems may attend the current approach, . . . treating states
as legal incompetents without capacity to enter into binding contracts seems extreme
and, indeed, quite insulting.
Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Berman, supra note 136, at 17.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 37.
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Professor Berman offers no normative justification for treating as
unconstitutional any conditional-funding statute that, by encouraging
states to take an action that they have a Tenth Amendment right not
to take, has the purpose of influencing the states’ behavior. It is
difficult to conceive of what the justification would be. Just like
Professor Baker, Professor Berman must explain why the
Constitution should prohibit states from contracting away some of
their freedom of action (for a temporary period) in exchange for what
they deem to be adequate consideration. And the implications of
Berman’s broad definition of penalty are far-reaching: all conditional
spending seeks to influence the states’ behavior. Even what Baker
calls “reimbursement spending” seeks to influence states—if only by
removing the financial barriers that may otherwise keep states from
pursuing certain policies.
Professor Berman seems concerned to avoid these possible
implications of his proposal. Thus, he insists that, even under his
159
analysis, “[r]eimbursement spending is not coercive.” And he states
that in “many” cases, even conditional spending laws that go beyond
160
“reimbursement spending” will not be coercive. To accommodate
these conclusions, however, Berman must retreat to what is
essentially a germaneness analysis: a funding condition is not
coercive, even if it seeks to influence state behavior, if it is justified by
“whatever national interests explain[ed] Congress’s willingness to
161
extend the offer” of federal funds in the first place. Under Berman’s
analysis, a court should ask whether Congress would have withheld
funds for violation of a spending condition if it were motivated solely
by the interests that prompted it to appropriate the funds in the first
place. If so, the condition is not coercive. Berman suggests that the
withholding of highway funds in Dole would probably constitute
coercion under this test, but the withholding of federal education
162
funds from states that refuse to prohibit guns in schools might not.
At this point, however, Professor Berman’s analysis runs into the
same problem that has made the nexus limitation so ineffective in
constraining the conditional spending power: any given appropriation
will serve multiple interests and have multiple motivations, and
Congress can spend for any reason it likes. How can a court decide

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 57.
See id. at 36–42, 55–56.
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what was “the” purpose of the spending to which the condition was
attached? How deeply must a court inquire into Congress’s
determination that a funding condition serves the same interests as
the original funding stream? The difficulty in answering these
questions ties up Berman’s proposal and lends a slicing-the-baloneytoo-thin quality to his application of that proposal to different fact
163
patterns. Even Professors Baker and Berman acknowledge that
there might be no “adequately administrable judicial doctrine” that
164
satisfactorily implements Berman’s proposal. It is doubtful judges
would even make the effort to create such a doctrine.
B. The Failure of Motivation
I have argued that any effort to put muscle into the general
welfare, nexus, and coercion limitations will require analytically
embarrassing distinctions. It will also raise serious normative doubts
in a Court that does not want to appear Lochneresque. But those
obstacles would be small, indeed, for judges who were intent on
finding a way to impose real limits on the conditional spending power.
163. Thus, Professor Berman says there is a possibility that a law conditioning federal
education funds on a state’s enactment of a law prohibiting guns around schools might not be
coercive if Congress’s real purpose was not “to punish or deter, but rather to not waste federal
money” (as it might be if “fear of gun violence had a measurable, deleterious effect on the
ability of students to learn”). Id. at 55–56. He argues that “[i]n all likelihood, an argument along
these lines would not, and should not, be credited,” id. at 56, but how is a court supposed to tell?
And why should it make a difference what Congress’s real purpose is (whatever that means)?
Berman also argues that federal matching grants are not coercive, even though withholding
funds directed at certain purposes from states that fail to pitch in their own funds seems like a
“penalty” based on his definition: “[I]f a state refuses, then whatever national interests explain
Congress’s willingness to extend the offer are still better served by the contribution than by the
withholding of federal dollars.” Id. at 57. He explains that
even if the federal government would actually prefer half the loaf to its next most
attractive alternative, successful realization of even that partial good is likely to
require some action by state actors, and Congress might reasonably worry that state
effort would prove lackadaisical . . . if the state is not itself financially committed.
Id. at 58. But why doesn’t an analogous argument mean that the federal funding condition in
Dole was constitutional? Successful realization of the goal of building safe highways is likely to
require action by state actors, and Congress might reasonably worry that a state that does not
raise its drinking age to the national standard is not serious about highway safety. And Berman
endorses what looks like a totally ad hoc exception to his analysis for antidiscrimination laws
like Section 504: those laws, he says, might be justified by the federal government’s “interests in
not exacerbating inequality.” Id. But that is an interest tied to the condition, not to the
underlying grant of funds. By parity of analysis, Congress should be able to justify the condition
in Dole by pointing to its strong interest in not exacerbating teenage drinking.
164. Baker & Berman, supra note 3, at 539 (“Whether an adequately administrable judicial
doctrine can be crafted to satisfactorily (albeit imperfectly) implement the understandings of
coercion and penalty . . . are important questions that the court would have to confront . . . .”).
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When a majority of the Rehnquist Court sought to impose limits on
Congress’s commerce power, after all, it relied on a distinction
between “economic” and “non-economic” activity—a distinction that
approaches analytical incoherence and that has little to recommend it
165
normatively. If a majority of the Supreme Court wanted to impose
some limits on the conditional spending power, it could easily speed
past the normative and analytic problems I have identified.
Contrary to the views of such scholars as Professors Baker and
166
Berman, there is little reason to believe that the conservative
Justices have any desire to impose significant direct limitations on the
167
conditional spending power. When the Rehnquist Court imposed
direct limitations on the Commerce power in Lopez and Morrison, it
was responding in part to the concern that the failure to do so would
abandon all pretense of limitations on federal power—a concern
underlined by the solicitor general’s oral argument in Lopez, in which
he was unable to come up with a single hypothetical statute that
168
would be beyond Congress’s commerce authority under his theory.
Opponents of the Dole regime often speak of the conditional
169
spending power as effectively unlimited, but that is not quite right.
Even in the absence of judicially imposed limits, the conditional
spending power contains an intrinsic limit that does not constrain
other federal powers: Congress cannot impose Spending Clause
regulations on unwilling states; those regulations depend on the
consent states are willing to give (and Congress’s willingness to find
170
the revenue to purchase that consent). Even a conservative Court

165. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–11 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 559–61 (1995). For criticisms of the economic-noneconomic distinction on analytic and
normative grounds, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 643–45 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 656–61
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. See Baker & Berman, supra note 3, at 461.
167. Here, I reach conclusions similar to Professor Neil Siegel’s. See Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s
Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 165, 169–89 (2008). But our analyses,
although compatible, differ. Whereas Siegel uses game-theory tools and casual observation of
the Justices’ decisions to support his conclusions, I look to the political stakes in conditional
spending cases. Those political stakes, I suggest, underlie the behavior Siegel models and
observes. Professor Simon Lazarus reaches similar conclusions based on his reading of the
Justice Roberts confirmation hearings. See Lazarus, supra note 23, at 30–31.
168. See Young, supra note 14, at 37–38.
169. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 1920 (“[I]f the Spending Clause is simultaneously
interpreted to permit Congress to seek otherwise forbidden regulatory aims indirectly through a
conditional offer of federal funds to the states, the notion of ‘a federal government of
enumerated powers’ will have no meaning.”).
170. See Galle, supra note 34, at 169.
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has reason to be relatively unconcerned with a broad congressional
power to try to persuade states to agree to spending conditions.
And there are substantial reasons why a conservative Court
would hesitate before imposing meaningful direct limitations on the
spending power. One involves the fear of Lochnerism. Strengthening
the direct limitations on the conditional spending power will require
courts to engage in the kind of second-guessing of Congress’s meansends judgments that conservative jurists foreswore in the wake of
Lochner.
Even aside from their interest in avoiding the appearance of
judicial activism, conservative judges have strong reasons to defend a
broad conditional spending power. As Professor Baker never tires of
pointing out, conditional spending legislation can just as readily be
171
used to achieve conservative ends as it can liberal ones. And robust
versions of the nexus and coercion tests could readily be applied
beyond the context of conditional funding of the states to more
general unconstitutional conditions cases involving conditional
funding of individuals and private entities—cases in which these tests
will be frequently invoked by funding recipients who seek to vindicate
172
politically liberal rights claims.
If the Court limited Congress to imposing conditions that relate
directly to some narrowly defined purpose of the money it gives to
states, it would be hard to keep lower courts from applying the same
rule to cases in which a federal funding condition implicates the
constitutionally protected conduct of private entities, for the Court

171. See supra note 144.
172. For examples of a cases in which a conservative court has rejected liberal
unconstitutional conditions claims that take this form, see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006) (holding that a statute withholding federal
funds from universities that did not give military recruiters access to students did not violate the
First Amendment); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001) (holding that a
statute prohibiting recipients of federal legal services funding from challenging welfare laws
violated the First Amendment); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572–73
(1998) (concluding that a statute requiring that “general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” be considered in the distribution of
federal arts funding “neither inherently interferes with First Amendment rights nor violates
constitutional vagueness principles”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (holding that
regulations that prohibited federally funded family-planning clinics from abortion counseling
did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments). For a sense of the conservative political uses to
which conditional funding of private entities can be put, see David Cole, Beyond
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 676–77 (1992).
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has applied some sort of nexus rule in both contexts. And it would
be even more difficult to avoid applying a beefed-up coercion test to
cases involving the funding of private entities: if a state—which is a
large entity with the power to tax—is coerced into accepting federal
funding conditions, surely a private entity without the power to tax is
even more coerced. The threat of taking away all of the federal
funding that goes to a private university if it does not permit military
174
recruiters access to its career services facilities is at least as coercive
as the threat of taking away all of a state’s federal special education
funds if it does not provide educational services to disabled students
175
who have been expelled; under definitions of coercion that focus on
whether the recipient had any fair or realistic choice but to accept, the
university is surely coerced even more than is the state.
To the extent that conservative Justices want to hold the line on
private entities’ challenges to conditions on the receipt of federal
funds, they will resist any effort to strengthen the nexus and coercion
limitations on conditional spending to states. Indeed, one might
plausibly attribute Chief Justice Rehnquist’s seemingly incongruous
opinion in Dole—in which, contrary to the thrust of Rehnquist’s
federalism jurisprudence, the Court imposed no meaningful
176
limitations on Congress’s conditional spending authority —to a
strategic concern that the nexus and coercion doctrines cannot be
effectively cabined to protect states from funding conditions without
also giving individuals a tool to challenge the conditions on welfare
benefits and other government funding they receive.
Finally, wholly aside from these sorts of rule-consequentialist
concerns, a robust coercion limitation seems, ideologically, more in
tune with liberal than with conservative jurisprudential style. The
notion that coercion can extend beyond the physical, and that the law
should take account of the pressures that make an individual unable,
as a practical matter, to resist a given course of action, is a notion that
is generally associated with the liberal position on a number of
177
doctrinal issues: broad duress defenses in criminal law; narrow
173. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 197–98 (applying such a test in an individual’s First
Amendment “unconstitutional conditions” challenge).
174. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1313.
175. See Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 560 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per
curiam).
176. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
177. See Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification,
Not an Excuse—And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 862 (2003) (“Liberals . . . wish
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notions of voluntary confessions, consent to searches, or waiver of
178
constitutional rights; expansive notions of unconscionability in
179
contract; and so forth. In each of these contexts, and many others, it
is liberals who urge that the doctrine should take an empathic view
that acknowledges the many pressures on one’s choices, and it is
conservatives who take a thinner, more individualistic view of free
180
choice. If conservative judges are to adopt a strict coercion
limitation on conditional spending, however, they will be forced to
argue for the sort of empathic view of choice that they typically reject.
They will be forced to argue that states have no real choice but to
take federal money, even though “nobody is putting a gun to the
state’s head.” Many conservatives are likely to see such an argument
as so inconsistent with their typical jurisprudential views as to be
181
undesirable.
II. THE POSSIBILITIES OF INDIRECT LIMITATIONS
In the previous Part, I argue that the Supreme Court is unlikely,
in the foreseeable future, to impose meaningful direct limitations on
Congress’s conditional spending power. But it is far more likely to
impose indirect limitations—limitations that do not prohibit Congress
from imposing substantive rules on the states through the conditional
spending power, but that either raise the cost of doing so or make it
difficult to enforce the rules Congress imposes. One such limitation—
the notion that conditions on federal spending are not “law” but are
merely contractual obligations—has not fared well in the courts, but it
may have brighter prospects in the future. I discuss that limitation in
Section A. As I show in Section B, the Supreme Court and some
lower courts have already used another such limitation—the
requirement that federal spending legislation give states clear notice

to expand the defense to encompass responses to ‘situational duress,’ that is, to natural threats
that persons of reasonable firmness would be unable to resist.”).
178. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 278 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 118 (1999)
(describing the role of liberal judges in spreading the unconscionability doctrine).
180. Professor Mark Kelman aptly notes that “[i]t is generally easy, in fact, to locate people
on our traditional political spectrum by ascertaining to what extent they are committed to
describing life in those spheres ‘unregulated’ by the state as free, chosen.” MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 102 (1987).
181. For one account of how this process might work in a private-law context, compare this
to Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues of Contract Law, 10 EUR.
REV. PRIVATE L. 7, 13–18, 25 (2001).
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of the conditions attached to it—with great frequency. Because both
the assertion that spending conditions are not law and the notice
requirement derive from the notion that conditional spending is (or is
in the nature of) a contract, I call these indirect limitations “contract
theories.” I call the principle that spending conditions are not law the
“strong contract theory,” and I call the notice requirement the “weak
contract theory.”
I argue that, as a normative matter, the Court should not adopt
either the strong or the weak contract theory. But, as a predictive
matter, the Court is nearly certain to continue to implement the weak
contract theory, and there is a chance (though not a big one) that it
will adopt the strong contract theory. Unlike the general welfare,
notice, and coercion limitations, the indirect limitations offered by the
two contract theories do not put courts in the Lochneresque position
of appearing to second-guess Congress’s policy judgments, nor do
those indirect limitations lead to especial analytic embarrassment.
Perhaps most importantly, the two contract theories do not bar the
types of conditional spending legislation that conservatives favor, and
they need not lead to liberal results in the sorts of unconstitutional
conditions cases in which conservatives defend spending conditions.
A conservative Court can therefore employ the contract theories to
limit the reach and enforceability of conditional spending legislation
passed by more liberal Congresses without threatening any particular
harm to legislation passed by more conservative Congresses.
A. Unenforceability and the Strong Contract Theory
The strong contract theory begins with the notion that
“legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to
182
comply with federally imposed conditions.” But to proponents of
that theory, conditional spending legislation is not just “in the nature
of” a contract; it is nothing but a contract. As I show in Section A.1,
the strong contract theory would substantially limit the enforceability
of spending conditions. Although a number of individual judges have
pressed versions of the theory in various opinions, I show in Section
A.2 that their positions have not prevailed. In Section A.3, I argue
against the strong contract theory, and suggest some reasons why,
though it is possible that a conservative court would use that theory to

182. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
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restrict Congress’s conditional spending power, it is not especially
likely.
1. The Theory. The strong contract theory is straightforward, if
radical. The theory posits that the spending power is not an
enumerated legislative power, so the ordinary accoutrements of
legislative power do not extend to laws passed pursuant to that
power. As Professor David Engdahl, the leading academic exponent
of the strong contract theory, explains:
[C]ongress’ power to spend money is not a legislative power. Our
Constitution does contemplate—and in some instances, even
specifies—that Congress will have certain non-legislative powers.
The power to spend—like the powers to receive and hold property,
to make contracts, and to sue for injuries like trespass and waste—
183
inhere in every body politic as an artificial person . . . .

Engdahl recognizes that the conditions accompanying the receipt of
federal funds “are specified by Congress in statutory form,” but he
argues that “they are not statutory in their effect: They have no force
at all as ‘law,’ but rather are binding, if at all, only by virtue of
184
contract.”
For Professor Engdahl, the contractual nature of conditional
spending legislation has a few key consequences. Because spending
conditions are not “law,” Congress cannot invoke the Necessary and
185
Proper Clause to effectuate the purposes of those conditions, nor
can those conditions preempt inconsistent state laws under the
186
Supremacy Clause. And private parties cannot challenge state
violations of spending conditions under § 1983, because that statute is
187
limited to enforcing “rights ‘secured by’ federal ‘laws.’”
In
Engdahl’s view, “third-party rights” under conditional spending
legislation “are ‘secured’ (if at all) not by any ‘law,’ but only by the
contract between the recipient and the United States, and section
183. Engdahl, supra note 127, at 498–99 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
184. Id. at 500 (emphasis omitted).
185. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 18–24 (“Congress thus may pursue policy objects
regarding extraneous matters, those policies remain extraneous to the enumerated powers;
therefore, those policies cannot invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause, which avails only for
effectuating ends within the enumerated powers.”).
186. See id. at 20–24, 62–78 (“[E]xtraneous objectives being promoted by taxing, by
spending, or by manipulating any other enumerated power may freely be frustrated or
countermanded by states.”).
187. Id. at 104 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
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1983 does not even remotely contemplate causes of action for
188
contract violations.” For the same reason, the strong contract theory
would bar private parties from suing to enforce spending conditions
189
under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. That doctrine “gives life to
the Supremacy Clause” by authorizing prospective remedies that are
190
“designed to end a continuing violation of federal law.” If spending
conditions are not “law,” there is no basis for applying the Ex parte
191
Young doctrine to enforce them.
2. The Failure (So Far) in the Cases. In a 2007 article, Professor
Engdahl asserts that “adherents of the contract thesis of the spending
power”—by which he appears to mean the strong contract theory I
discuss here—“currently comprise a thin, but relatively young and
vigorous, majority of the Supreme Court,” and that there is thus
“good reason to expect important additional developments, at least
192
with regard to third-party beneficiary actions.” But although a few
Justices have endorsed aspects of the strong contract theory in
concurring or dissenting opinions, they have not persuaded a majority
to go along. And the courts of appeals have uniformly rejected that
theory.
193
Concurring in Blessing v. Freestone —a case that reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that § 1983 can be used to enforce Title IV-D
194
of the Social Security Act —Justice Scalia suggested some sympathy
with the strong contract theory. In his opinion, which Justice Kennedy
joined, Justice Scalia went out of his way to observe that the Court’s
disposition of the case made it “unnecessary to reach the question
whether § 1983 ever authorizes the beneficiaries of a federal-state
funding and spending agreement—such as Title IV-D—to bring
195
suit.” He noted that it “appears to have been the law at the time
196
§ 1983 was enacted” that a third-party beneficiary was “regarded as
188. Id.
189. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
190. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
191. See Engdahl, supra note 127, at 534 n.266 (citing favorably the district court’s decision
in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561–89 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev’d, 289 F.3d
852 (6th Cir. 2002), which held that spending conditions could not be enforced under § 1983 or
Ex parte Young).
192. Engdahl, supra note 127, at 527.
193. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
194. Id. at 333.
195. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 350.
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a stranger to the contract, and could not sue upon it.” He therefore
declared himself open to the argument that conditional spending laws
do not “secure” any rights in third-party beneficiaries for purposes of
198
§ 1983. Concurring in the judgment in a later case, Justice Thomas
stated that the “contract analogy raises serious questions as to
whether third parties may sue to enforce Spending Clause
legislation—through pre-emption or otherwise,” though he declined
199
to reach the questions because the parties had not raised them.
But even in those cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas did not
suggest that they would fully endorse the strong contract theory. That
theory, after all, denies Congress the power to make spending
conditions enforceable against states by third parties. But in his
Blessing concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that his position was
rooted in statutory interpretation—that “the understanding of § 1983
when it was enacted” incorporated the then-dominant rule that third200
party beneficiaries could not sue to enforce a contract. And in his
201
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh
opinion, Justice Thomas seemed to say that Congress had the power
to give third parties a private right of action to enforce conditional
202
spending laws.
And in other cases, majorities of the Court (joined, in most cases,
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas), have rejected key
203
components of the strong contract theory. In Barnes v. Gorman,
which I discuss in Section B.1.a as an example of the Court employing
the weak contract theory, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion expressly
disclaimed any implication “that suits under Spending Clause

197. Id. at 349.
198. See id. at 349–50.
199. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
200. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., concurring).
201. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
202. See id. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
Under this Court’s precedents, private parties may employ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or an
implied private right of action only if they demonstrate an “unambiguously conferred
right.” Petitioner quite obviously cannot satisfy this requirement and therefore
arguably is not entitled to bring a pre-emption lawsuit as a third-party beneficiary to
the Medicaid contract. . . . [W]ere the issue to be raised, I would give careful
consideration to whether Spending Clause legislation can be enforced by third parties
in the absence of a private right of action.
Id.
203. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
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legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply
204
205
to all issues that they raise.” In Frew v. Hawkins, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for a unanimous Court upheld enforcement of a
consent decree that Texas officials had entered into with private
plaintiffs to resolve a claim that the state was violating its obligations
206
under the Medicaid program (a conditional spending program).
Although the strong contract theory would provide that Medicaid
obligations are not “law,” the Court stated that the consent decree
enforcing those obligations was “a federal decree entered to
implement a federal statute” and thus was “consistent with Ex parte
207
Young.”
208
And in Sabri v. United States, the Court upheld a criminal
209
prohibition on bribery in entities that receive federal funds. The
Court explained that Congress had power, under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, “to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under
210
[the spending] power are in fact spent for the general welfare.”
Although the strong contract theory would hold that the Necessary
and Proper Clause is inapplicable to the spending power, and that
conditional spending laws accordingly cannot bind third parties, every
Justice but Justice Thomas signed onto the majority opinion. Justice
Thomas voted to uphold the statute on Commerce Clause grounds
and thus did not reach the question “whether Congress’ power to
spend combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause could
211
authorize the enactment of” the statute before the Court. He did
not, however, challenge the proposition that Congress may use the
Necessary and Proper Clause to support legislation enacted pursuant
to the spending power. He merely “f[ou]nd questionable the scope
the Court g[ave] to the Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to
Congress’ authority to spend,” with a particular focus on the Court’s
212
application of the nexus requirement.

204.
Court.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 188–89 n.2. Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004).
Id. at 436–37.
Id. at 439.
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
Id. at 602.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 614 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
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In recent years, only one lower court has endorsed the strong
contract theory: the Eastern District of Michigan, in Westside Mothers
213
v. Haveman. But the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision in that case and held that conditional spending legislation,
rather than being merely a contract, is the supreme law of the land
214
and is enforceable under both § 1983 and Ex parte Young. And the
other courts of appeals to confront the question have rejected the
215
district court’s Westside Mothers holding as well. To this point, the
strong contract theory has not been successful in the courts.
3. Assessment. Despite Professor Engdahl’s optimism, I think it
quite unlikely that the Supreme Court will adopt the strong contract
theory any time soon. The major problem is that too much precedent
stands in the way. Although the Court has never squarely confronted
the argument that the conditional spending power is not a
“legislative” power, it has decided a number of cases that are
inconsistent with the strong contract theory. As Engdahl
216
acknowledges,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
conditional spending statutes preempt inconsistent state legislation
217
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. That is true even in cases in
which the state is not a party to the contract created by the spending
statute (as when a state law permits the attachment of funds received
by private parties as Social Security or Veterans’ Administration
218
benefits). And, as discussed in Section A.2, the Court has held that
213. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587–88 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding
that state obligations under the Medicaid statute are not “law” for purposes of the Supremacy
Clause and may not be enforced under § 1983 or Ex parte Young), rev’d, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir.
2002).
214. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 860, 862–63.
215. See, e.g., Frazar v. Hawkins, 376 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the panel had
“rejected” the “so-called Westside Mothers arguments” in a previous appeal); Mo. Child Care
Ass’n v. Cross, 294 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have found no other decision in which
any federal court of appeals has held that legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending
Clause powers is not part of the supreme law of the land. We agree with the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoned rejection of this argument and likewise reject the argument here.” (citation omitted));
Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 188 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an argument in line with the
district court’s ruling in Westside Mothers as a “novel position” that was “at odds with existing,
binding precedent”).
216. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 62–78.
217. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 138 (1982); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604
(1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
218. See Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 396 (1988) (per curiam) (holding that an
Arkansas statute, which permits the state to seize prisoners’ property to defray the costs of their
incarceration, is preempted to the extent that it is applied to seize property received as Social
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Congress has power, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to
regulate (and indeed impose criminal liability on) third parties whose
actions might interfere with the administration of federally funded
219
state programs. The Court has also, on three occasions, held that
particular conditional spending statutes were “laws” that “secured”
220
rights in private parties for purposes of § 1983.
It is possible that the Court could say that the validity of the
strong contract theory was not squarely presented in any of these
cases. But in each one, an essential part of the Court’s analysis and
holding was directly inconsistent with the notion that conditional
spending statutes are not “law” but are merely contract. I doubt the
Court would adopt a rule that flies in the face of so much precedent.
Precedent aside, there are substantial problems with the strong
contract theory. Conditional spending statutes are no less “law” than
221
any other kind of federal legislation. Like all other federal
legislation, they must go through the Article I, Section 7 process of
bicameralism and presentment. To be sure, the obligations they
impose on a state depend on satisfaction of a condition subsequent—
the state’s acceptance of the conditional offer of federal funds—but
that fact does not make their obligations any less binding (or any less
a product of “law”) than the obligations imposed by any other federal
statute. As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has explained, “[a] State
certainly gets to decide whether to participate in a federal program
like Medicaid; but once it has made the choice to participate, it must
comply with the terms of that law, just as it must follow all federal
222
laws that apply to it.”
It bears emphasis that Professor Engdahl’s theory is not merely a
rule for interpreting Spending Clause statutes—a rule, for example,
that courts should read those statutes as not authorizing private rights
Security or benefits); see also Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973)
(holding that the Social Security Act bars the State of New Jersey from attaching Social Security
benefits as reimbursements for state welfare payments).
219. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).
220. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (Boren Amendment to
Medicaid Act); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432
(1987) (Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4
(1980) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children Provisions of the Social Security Act).
221. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ensuring the Supremacy of Federal Law: Why the District
Court was Wrong in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 145 (2002)
(“Nothing in the Constitution’s language, or any Supreme Court precedent, draws a distinction
among federal laws, denying some status as the supreme law of the land.”).
222. Id. at 146.
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of action or having preemptive effect unless Congress specifies
otherwise. Such a rule would be an instantiation of the weak contract
theory, which I discuss below. Engdahl’s strong contract theory
would, as a matter of constitutional law, bar Congress from giving a
Spending Clause statute preemptive effect, authorizing a private right
of action for its violation, and enacting additional laws necessary and
proper to carrying it out. To justify that position, Engdahl must
answer the question why this congressional power is different from all
other congressional powers. Engdahl answers the question by
asserting that, unlike the other powers, the spending power is not an
223
enumerated legislative power. If the spending power is not such a
power, he contends, it is not one of the “Powers vested by this
224
Constitution in the Government of the United States” for purposes
225
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Nor is a conditional spending
226
statute “supreme Law of the Land,” because it is not a law “made in
227
228
Pursuance” of the Constitution.
229
But, as Professor Engdahl himself acknowledges, the Supreme
Court has long held that the spending power is enumerated in the
General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8—the section that sets
230
forth most of Congress’s legislative powers. And even Alexander
Hamilton—a signer of the Constitution, one of the most important
Founders, and the person whose understanding of the spending
power has been accepted as correct by both the Supreme Court and
Engdahl himself—described the General Welfare Clause as the
231
source of Congress’s spending power.
Once one accepts the premise that the General Welfare Clause is
the source of Congress’s spending power, Professor Engdahl’s
argument falls apart. The General Welfare Clause, after all, is also the
223. See Engdahl, supra note 127, at 498–500.
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
225. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 18.
226. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
227. Id.
228. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 20.
229. See id. at 49–50.
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States.”); see, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987)
(citing cases); see also Galle, supra note 34, at 168 (making this point about Professor Engdahl’s
argument).
231. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 53 (“It is true that even Hamilton attributed the
spending power to the Taxing Clause.”).
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source of Congress’s taxing power—a power that no one can doubt is
legislative. There is no textual basis in the General Welfare Clause,
the Necessary and Proper Clause, or the Supremacy Clause for
treating the taxing and spending powers as lacking the entailments of
other congressional powers. It would be surprising if a conservative
court upended so much precedent to adopt a purportedly textual
interpretation of the Constitution that seems so inconsistent with
both the text and the original understanding.
B. Notice—The Weak Contract Theory
In his opinion for the Court in Pennhurst State School and
232
Hospital v. Halderman, then–Associate Justice Rehnquist did not
draw a contractual analogy to support Professor Engdahl’s strong
contract theory. Instead, he drew that analogy to support a notice
requirement:
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
“contract.” There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a
State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is
233
expected of it.

“Accordingly,” the Court concluded, “if Congress intends to impose a
condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice,
we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of
234
the consequences of their participation.” The Court applied that
rule to hold that the “least restrictive” language of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975
did not impose judicially enforceable obligations on the states. That
language, which appeared in a statutory “finding,” stated that
“treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental
disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental
potential of the person and should be provided in the setting that is

232. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
233. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
234. Id. (citations omitted).
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least restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.” The Court
explained that “[i]t is difficult to know what is meant by providing
‘appropriate treatment’ in the ‘least restrictive’ setting, and it is
unlikely that a State would have accepted federal funds had it known
236
it would be bound to” such a “largely indeterminate” obligation.
And the placement of the “appropriate treatment” and “least
restrictive setting” language in a general statement of “findings” fell
“well short of providing clear notice to the States that they, by
accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply
237
with” that language.
Although Pennhurst seems like a straightforward application of
the clear-statement rule that the Court often invokes in cases in which
238
federal legislation alters the federal-state balance, both the Supreme
Court and lower courts have gone well beyond ordinary clearstatement principles in applying the notice rule to conditional
spending cases. As I show in Section B.1, courts have applied that
rule to require a variety of different sorts of notice and have thereby
significantly limited the enforceability of a number of important
federal spending conditions. Although the Rehnquist Court passed up
some opportunities to apply an even more stringent notice rule, the
possibility remains a very live one. In Section B.2, I assess the
likelihood that the Roberts Court will take up that possibility.
Although there are substantial normative objections to applying a
super-strong clear-statement rule to conditional spending legislation,
I conclude that the Court will likely apply just such a rule to a greater
and greater extent in the near future.
1. Possibilities and Limits in the Cases. Cases in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts have interpreted the Spending Clause
notice requirement as (more or less stringently) demanding that
funding recipients receive three different types of notice before being
held liable for violation of a funding condition: (a) notice of the
remedy for violation of a funding condition, (b) notice of how the
substantive rule imposed by that condition applies to particular facts,
and (c) notice of the facts in a given case that violate that condition.
235. Id. at 13 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976)).
236. Id. at 24–25.
237. Id. at 25.
238. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT.
REV. 125, 189 (treating the Pennhurst-derived notice principle as “just a clear statement rule,
that functions here just as any clear statement rule”).
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Each of these applications of the notice rule derives in some way from
the holding and discussion in Pennhurst.
a. Notice of the Remedy. In a number of cases, the Court has
applied Pennhurst to hold that particular remedies will not be
available for violation of a funding condition unless the states were on
notice that those remedies would be available at the time they agreed
to accept the federal money. For example, in Gonzaga University v.
239
Doe, the Court held that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
240
Act could not be enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court relied
on Pennhurst’s statement that “[i]n legislation enacted pursuant to
the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with
federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for
noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to
241
terminate funds to the State,” and its holding that “unless Congress
‘speak[s] with a clear voice,’ and manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to
confer individual rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis
242
for private enforcement by § 1983.” Applying these principles, the
Gonzaga Court held that the statute’s institutionally focused
language—which prohibits the Department of Education from
funding an educational institution with a “policy or practice of
permitting the release of education records”—did not unambiguously
give individual students the right to be free from the release of their
243
records.
In Barnes v. Gorman, the Court applied the same principle to
hold that, even when a private right of action to enforce a piece of
conditional spending legislation exists, plaintiffs may not recover
punitive damages unless the statute specifically put recipient states on
244
notice of the availability of that remedy. The Court explained that,
when conditional spending legislation gives individuals a right of
action, a state that receives funds “is generally on notice that it is
subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant
legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits
245
for breach of contract.” But punitive damages are not traditionally
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 280 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28).
Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 28).
Id. at 287–88 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000)).
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185–88 (2002).
Id. at 187.
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246

available for breaches of contract. Moreover, the Court concluded,
it is unlikely that a state would ever agree to accept federal funds if
doing so exposed it “to such unorthodox and indeterminate
247
liability.” In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v.
248
Murphy, which I discussed in the Introduction, the Court used the
same sort of analysis to conclude that the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act’s fee-shifting provision—which entitles prevailing
parents to recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” in
249
proceedings to enforce the statute —did not put states on notice that
250
they would be liable to pay those parents’ expert fees.
The most extreme application of the notice-of-remedy
requirement appears in the Second Circuit’s decision in Garcia v.
251
S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center. The case involved Section 504 of
252
the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits disability discrimination by
253
recipients of federal funds and provides that states that receive
federal funds must waive their sovereign immunity against claims
254
under the statute. The Second Circuit agreed that the statutory
language “constitutes a clear expression of Congress’s intent to
condition acceptance of federal funds on a state’s waiver of its
255
Eleventh Amendment immunity.” But it concluded that New York
had not knowingly waived its sovereign immunity against
Rehabilitation Act claims when it accepted federal funds from 1993 to
256
1995 (when the dispute in Garcia arose).
The Garcia court’s reasoning was somewhat convoluted: Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (which became effective in
257
1992) imposes on all states the same substantive obligations that the
258
Rehabilitation Act places on recipients of federal funds, and the
ADA contains a provision that expressly abrogates state sovereign
246. See id. at 187–88.
247. Id. at 188.
248. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
249. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006).
250. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459–61 (2006).
251. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001).
252. Id. at 104.
253. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
254. See id. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2000).
255. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 113.
256. Id. at 114.
257. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, § 205(a), 104 Stat. 327, 338
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2000)).
258. See id. §§ 12131(1), 12134(b), 12201(a).
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259

immunity —although the Supreme Court held that provision
unconstitutional in at least some cases in Board of Trustees v.
260
Garrett. If the ADA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity was
unconstitutional as a whole—as Garrett might have been read to
suggest—the Rehabilitation Act’s requirement of waiver would, to be
sure, have a significant legal effect. But between the effective date of
the ADA and the Garrett decision, “a state accepting conditioned
federal funds could not have understood that in doing so it was
actually abandoning its sovereign immunity from private damages
suits [because] by all reasonable appearances, state sovereign
261
immunity had already been lost.” In other words, Garcia held that
spending-power legislation must give states notice not just of the
formal legal consequences of any conditions attached to the receipt of
funds but also of the baseline legal regime and the incremental change
the conditions make to it. A panel of the Fifth Circuit followed
Garcia in holding that the state’s acceptance of federal funds prior to
a 2001 case in which that court held the ADA’s abrogation of
262
sovereign immunity unconstitutional “did not manifest a knowing
waiver of that which they could not know they had the power to
263
waive.” The panel’s ruling on that point was overturned en banc,
264
however. Except for the Fifth Circuit’s panel decision, courts
outside of the Second Circuit have rejected the Garcia requirement of
265
notice of incremental legal effect.
But the Second Circuit’s
formulation illustrates the lengths to which the notice-of-remedies
requirement can be pushed.
b. Notice of How the Substantive Rule Applies to Particular Facts.
Some courts have read Pennhurst as requiring that spending
legislation set forth the conditions attached to it with greater

259. Id. § 12202.
260. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368–74 (2001).
261. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 114 (citation omitted) (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999)).
262. The case was Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2001).
263. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 325 F.3d 609, 616–17 (5th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc, 403
F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005).
264. See Pace, 403 F.3d at 277.
265. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors, 411 F.3d 474, 495 (4th Cir. 2005); Barbour v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Nieves-Márquez v.
Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 129–30 (1st Cir. 2003); Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 601–04 (8th
Cir. 2003); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 341 F.3d 234, 250–54 (3d Cir. 2003); Garrett v. Univ. of
Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
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precision than is normally demanded of federal laws. Unless the state
receiving federal funds has notice of how the substantive obligation
imposed on it applies to particular fact settings, these courts rule, the
condition is invalid (or at least cannot be enforced in a private
damages action). The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Virginia
Department of Education v. Riley offers an example. In Riley, the
court addressed the question whether a state may refuse to educate a
student with a disability who is expelled from school for reasons
266
unrelated to that student’s disability. The statute, as written at the
time, required that states receiving federal funds “ha[ve] in effect a
policy that assures all children with disabilities the right to a free
267
appropriate public education.”
Because the statute guaranteed all children with disabilities “the
right to” education, but it did not expressly disclaim the proposition
that a student may waive that right by misconduct, the court
concluded that the statute did not clearly require the state to educate
students with disabilities who had been expelled for non-disabilityrelated misconduct:
Applying the clear statement rule with the required solicitude for
the rights of the States in our federalist system, it is apparent that
Congress has not spoken through the IDEA with anywhere near the
clarity and the degree of specificity required for us to conclude that
the States’ receipt of special education funds is conditioned upon
their continued provision of education to handicapped students
expelled for criminal activity or other misconduct unrelated to their
disabilities. The majority is unable to cite to a single word from the
statute or from the legislative history of IDEA evidencing that
Congress even considered such a condition, much less that it
confronted the possibility of such a condition and its implications for
the sovereignty of the States, and determined to condition the
268
States’ funds in this manner.

The Riley court thus concluded that Congress’s failure to disclaim an
exception from a broad general statute created an ambiguity that the
court was required to read in the state’s favor by treating the statute
269
as in fact containing that exception. Needless to say, that is not the

266. Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 560 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam).
267. Id. at 563 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)).
268. Id. at 567. The opinion refers to “the majority” because the Fourth Circuit sitting en
banc simply adopted Judge Luttig’s panel dissent as its opinion on this point. Id. at 560–61.
269. Id. at 567–68.
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ordinary practice in interpreting statutes outside of the conditional
270
spending context.
In his opinion in Guardians Association v. Civil Service
271
Commission, Justice White applied the same principle to require
Spending Clause legislation to be framed in relatively rulelike form to
authorize damages liability. Guardians involved a claim of disparateimpact discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
272
1964. Justice White (whose opinion was controlling on this point)
held that, because Title VI “is spending-power legislation,” funding
recipients could not be liable to pay damages for violating the
273
statute’s disparate impact prohibition. When that prohibition is at
issue, Justice White explained, “it is not immediately obvious what
the grantee’s obligations under the federal program were and it is
surely not obvious that the grantee was aware that it was
administering the program in violation of the statute or
274
regulations.”
The Supreme Court has not been consistent in requiring that
states get such precise notice of the obligations that they undertake
when receiving federal funds, however. Indeed, in Bennett v.
275
Kentucky Department of Education, the Court held that Pennhurst
does not require “every improper expenditure” of federal funds to be
276
“specifically identified and proscribed in advance.” And two 5–4
decisions in the late Rehnquist Court—Davis v. Monroe County
277
Board of Education,
and Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
278
Education —strongly undercut the notion that Congress must give
states precise notice of how spending conditions apply to particular
facts.
In Davis, the Court (speaking through Justice O’Connor) held
that the test for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX
of the Education Amendments was sufficiently clear to permit a

270. Cf. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a statute can
be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.
It demonstrates breadth.” (quoting Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985))).
271. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
272. Id. at 586 (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
273. Id. at 598–99.
274. Id.
275. Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656 (1985).
276. Id. at 666.
277. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
278. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005).

BAGENSTOS IN FINAL2.DOC

11/16/2008 9:58:47 PM

400

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:345

279

damages award. That was true even though the test was phrased in
quite general terms—actionable harassment must be “so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the
victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided
280
by the school.”
Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged that
“[w]hether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable
‘harassment’ . . . ‘depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships,’ including, but not
limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of
281
individuals involved.” In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy
criticized the Court for failing to “explain how a school is supposed to
discern from this mishmash of factors what is actionable
282
discrimination.” The Court’s “multifactored balancing test,” he
concluded, “is a far cry from the clarity we demand of Spending
283
Clause legislation.”
In Jackson, the Court (also speaking through Justice O’Connor)
held that Title IX prohibits retaliation even though its text prohibits
284
only “discrimination” that is “on the basis of sex.” The Court
explained that “the [defendant School] Board should have been put
on notice by the fact that our cases . . . have consistently interpreted
Title IX’s private cause of action broadly to encompass diverse forms
285
of intentional sex discrimination.” Moreover, the Court explained,
regulations prohibiting retaliation under Title IX had “been on the
books for nearly 30 years,” and “the Courts of Appeals that had
considered the question at the time of the conduct at issue” had all
286
“interpreted Title IX to cover retaliation.” In dissent, Justice
Thomas argued (quite plausibly) that “discrimination on the basis of
sex” does not clearly encompass retaliation for complaining about
sex-based discrimination, that no prior Supreme Court case had held
that retaliation was one of the “diverse forms of intentional sex

279. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 651 (citation omitted) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).
282. Id. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
283. Id.
284. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a) (2000)).
285. Id. at 183.
286. Id.
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discrimination” covered by the statute, and that the relevant
287
regulation did not state that Title IX itself prohibited retaliation.
But although Justice Kennedy spoke in dissent in Davis, and
Justice Thomas spoke in dissent in Jackson, their position could well
be the majority one on the Roberts Court. Davis and Jackson were 5–
4 decisions, in which Justice O’Connor joined Justices Stevens,
288
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer to make a majority. Justice Alito, who
replaced Justice O’Connor, wrote for the Court in Arlington
289
Central. The gratuitous discussion of the requirement for clear
notice in his opinion for the Court in that case suggests, even if it does
not prove, that Justice Alito embraces a robust understanding of the
290
Pennhurst notice doctrine. Had he been on the Court at the time
Davis and Jackson were decided, those cases could easily have come
291
out the other way.
c. Notice of the Facts that Violate the Condition. In two cases, the
Supreme Court has read Pennhurst as at least presumptively barring a
damages remedy for “unintentional” violations of spending
conditions. In so doing, the Court has effectively extended the notice
principle to demand that the funding recipient have notice of the facts
that violated the spending condition at issue—at the time of
violation—to be held liable in damages.
The Court first suggested this reading of Pennhurst, by negative
292
implication, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools. In that
case, the Court rejected the argument that Pennhurst barred
monetary relief under Title IX for teacher-on-student sexual
harassment. The Court explained, “The point of not permitting
monetary damages for an unintentional violation is that the receiving
entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary
award. This notice problem does not arise in a case such as this, in
293
which intentional discrimination is alleged.” The Court pointed to

287. Id. at 190–92 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 169 (majority opinion); Davis, 526 U.S. at 632.
289. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2006).
290. See id. at 2459–63 (holding that the Spending Clause requires Congress to give clear
notice to the states when attaching conditions to the acceptance of federal funds).
291. For a similar assessment of the effects of Justice O’Connor’s replacement by Justice
Alito, see Engdahl, supra note 127, at 523–26.
292. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
293. Id. at 74–75 (citation omitted).
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Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone —a Section 504 case that itself
295
relied on Justice White’s controlling opinion in Guardians —as
“bel[ying]” the “notion that Spending Clause statutes do not
296
authorize monetary awards for intentional violations.” Franklin
thus held that Spending Clause statutes can authorize monetary relief
297
for intentional violations of funding conditions. But it also suggested
that the notice principle implies that such statutes will not authorize
298
monetary relief for unintentional violations. The Court confirmed
that suggestion, but also made clear that it rests on an inference about
what Congress would have intended, in Gebser v. Lago Vista
299
Independent School District.
Like Franklin, Gebser was a Title IX case involving teacher-on300
student sexual harassment. Franklin had held that a school district
can under some circumstances be liable under the statute for a
301
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student, but it had not addressed
the circumstances in which the district’s liability would attach. The
plaintiff in Gebser argued that the school district should be liable for a
teacher’s harassment under either a respondeat superior or a
302
constructive notice theory, but the Court rejected those arguments.
“If a school district’s liability for a teacher’s sexual harassment rests
on principles of constructive notice or respondeat superior,” the Court
concluded, funding recipients will often be held liable for
303
discrimination of which they were “unaware.” In light of the
“central concern” with “ensuring that ‘the receiving entity of federal
funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award,’” the
Court found it “sensible to assume that Congress did not envision a
304
recipient’s liability in damages in that situation.” Accordingly, in
cases like Gebser’s “that do not involve official policy of the recipient
entity,” the Court fashioned a standard of liability that would ensure
that the entity has notice: “a damages remedy will not lie under Title

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
See id. at 630 & n.9.
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
Id.
Id. at 74.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287–88 (1998).
Id. at 277–79.
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75–76.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 287–88 (alteration in original) (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74).
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IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the
305
recipient’s programs and fails adequately to respond.”
2. Assessment
a. Normative Assessment. In many cases in which it has been
invoked, the notice principle appears to have done no formal work. In
particular, the notice-of-remedy variant largely tracks the restrictive
jurisprudence the Supreme Court has applied to determine the
existence and scope of private rights of action more generally. In
Pennhurst, for example, the generally phrased statutory “finding[]”
that treatment “should be provided in the setting that is least
306
restrictive” would not suffice to support a private right of action
even outside of the Spending Clause context under the Court’s
307
jurisprudence of implied private rights of action and § 1983. Indeed,
the Court has looked to Pennhurst to determine whether statutes
308
adopted under other federal powers are privately enforceable.
Similarly, in Gonzaga, the statute’s lack of “rights-creating
309
language” would likely have doomed any effort to invoke a cause of
action under § 1983, even if the statute had not been adopted under
310
the spending power. (It is possible that Spending Clause statutes
may be especially likely, as an empirical matter, to lack that sort of
language.) And in Barnes and Arlington Central, the remedies at
issue—punitive damages and expert fees, respectively—would not
ordinarily have been available under statutes that were not adopted
311
under the spending power.

305. Id. at 290.
306. Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp., 451 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6010).
307. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979).
308. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)
(relying on Pennhurst as setting forth part of the standard for determining whether the National
Labor Relations Act—a Commerce Clause statute—is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
309. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002).
310. Indeed, the bulk of Gonzaga’s analysis proceeds without any discussion of the spending
power. See id. at 283–87.
311. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 (2006)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that attorneys’ fee–
shifting provisions do not address expert witness fees even absent any special spending-power
considerations unless Congress makes that clear in the statute); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181,
191–93 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that governmental entities “are
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In cases like Pennhurst, Gonzaga, Barnes, and Arlington Central,
then, the notice requirement had little more than rhetorical
significance to the Court’s holding. To be sure, rhetoric can be
important, particularly in the signal it sends lower courts. Although
the presence of conditional spending legislation seems to have made
no difference to the outcomes of Pennhurst, Gonzaga, Barnes, and
Arlington Central, lower courts may well take the Court’s language in
those cases seriously and, in practice, be more parsimonious in finding
judicial remedies for violations of spending conditions. But it is in the
other contexts I discussed in the previous Section that the notice
requirement has had, and is likely in the future to have, the greatest
bite.
In my view, there is no good justification for the peculiar
Spending Clause notice requirement in the cases in which it has bite.
That requirement seems to draw on both the general clear-statement
rule that applies when “Congress intends to alter the ‘usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
312
Government’” —and the policies of constitutional avoidance and
313
deliberation that support such a rule —and the doctrine of contra
proferentem (the principle that ambiguous terms in contracts are
314
construed against their drafters). I have no quarrel with either the
standard federalism-based clear-statement rule or the doctrine of
315
contra proferentem.
But those principles do not justify any
requirement for notice of (a) the incremental legal effect of a
spending condition, (b) the outcomes that will follow when the
not subject to punitive damages” even absent any special spending-power considerations unless
there is “clear congressional intent to the contrary”).
312. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
313. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1992) (explaining
that clear-statement rules “can protect important constitutional values against accidental or
undeliberated infringement by requiring Congress to address those values specifically and
directly”).
314. See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:12, at 471–82 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 2008).
Professor Peter Smith calls these two aspects of the notice rule (federalism and contra
proferentem, respectively) the “accountability model,” Smith, supra note 34, at 1189, and the
“state choice model,” id. at 1190; he contends that the latter should predominate, see id. passim.
315. In this respect I disagree with Professor Brian Galle, who has written the most
thorough critique of the Spending Clause notice doctrine to date. See Galle, supra note 34
passim. Galle writes in terms that would condemn all federalism-based clear-statement rules, id.
at 199–200, and he entirely ignores the contract-law doctrine of contra proferentem. (Galle
makes clear that he rejects federalism-based clear-statement rules in Galle, supra note 31, at 52–
53, 72–73.)
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condition is applied to particular facts, or (c) the underlying facts that
have occurred and violated the condition.
When, as in the Second Circuit’s Garcia case, a conditional
spending statute gives clear notice of the formal legal effect of
accepting funds, but confusion about background legal principles
leads the state erroneously to believe that the condition will have no
316
practical effect, neither of the justifications for the notice rule would
support excusing the state from performing the condition. In such a
case, Congress has stated that it intends to alter the “usual
317
constitutional balance” (in Garcia, by demanding that states waive
sovereign immunity in exchange for accepting federal funds), so the
318
federalism-based clear-statement rule is plainly satisfied. For the
same reason, the rule of contra proferentem would not apply, because
that rule comes into play only when the terms of a contract are
319
ambiguous. If anything, the proper contract analogy is the doctrine
of unilateral mistake. But that doctrine could not help a state in the
Garcia situation. Under that doctrine, a contract is voidable on the
grounds of mistake only if it would be in some way unfair to hold the
320
mistaken party to its bargain. But there is hardly any unfairness in
holding the state to its bargain in a case like Garcia: the state argued
that, when it accepted federal funds, it mistakenly thought it was not
321
giving the federal government anything in exchange. The state
322
could not have reasonably expected to get something for nothing.
316. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001).
317. Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (quoting Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 242).
318. It makes no difference that what the state is waiving is a constitutional right (the right
to sovereign immunity). Even in the context of individual rights, the Court has held, for
example, that “[t]he Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand
every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987).
319. See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 314, § 32:12, at 480.
320. The Restatement of Contracts, for example, states that a unilateral mistake will make a
contract voidable only if the mistaken party exercised sufficient diligence and either “the effect
of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable,”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1979), or “the other party had reason to know
of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake,” id. § 154 app. (quoting Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v.
Am. Sterilizer Co., 622 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1980)).
321. Supplemental Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 11–14, Garcia, 280 F.3d 98 (No. 009223), 2001 WL 34108906.
322. There is another problem with Garcia. Under standard contract law the proper remedy
for a unilateral mistake would not be to allow the mistaken party to keep the benefits it
obtained, while excusing it of its obligations, under the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 158. But that is precisely what the Garcia court permitted New York to do.
See Garcia, 280 F.3d at 114–15.
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The notion that conditional spending legislation should provide
notice of how it applies to particular facts has more to say for it, but
not much more. It is a commonplace of statutory interpretation that
laws may have applications that go far beyond what legislators who
voted for them might have contemplated. Some of those applications
might, indeed, raise significant federalism concerns that do not apply
to the rest of the statute’s applications. The Fourth Circuit thought it
was confronted with such an application in Virginia Department of
Education v. Riley—the requirement to provide education to students
with disabilities even after they have been expelled from school, the
court believed, entrenched on the state’s core powers of school
discipline and law enforcement in ways that went well beyond the
323
IDEA’s general requirement to educate children with disabilities.
When a statute is truly ambiguous, such unforeseen applications
might well be excised by applying the ordinary federalism-based
324
clear-statement rule. There is no reason to require any additional
increment of clarity for statutes enacted pursuant to the spending
power. And when, as in Riley, the state seeks to read an unexpressed
325
exception into a broad statutory requirement, the Court’s own
settled clear-statement doctrine would find no genuine ambiguity:
“[T]he fact that a statute can be ‘applied in situations not expressly
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It
326
demonstrates breadth.’”
Even though there might be some basis in ordinary clearstatement principles to excise particular applications that have
unusually large federalism costs, there is no basis for the rule Justice
White applied in Guardians and four Justices would have applied in
Davis and Jackson—that a funding recipient cannot be liable for
violating a federal spending condition unless that condition is framed
in such rule-like terms that it is “immediately obvious” what precise
327
conduct violates it. The federalism-based clear-statement doctrine,
323. See Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 566–68 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per
curiam).
324. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991).
325. See Riley, 106 F.3d at 560.
326. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)). As noted above, see supra note 314 and accompanying
text, contra proferentem principles also require genuine ambiguity.
327. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983) (opinion of White, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court); see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 675 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s “multifactored balancing
test is a far cry from the clarity we demand of Spending Clause legislation”).
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as it has been elaborated by the Court, is not concerned with the
forms Congress’s directives to states take. Rather, it is rooted in a
concern that Congress deliberate before it alters the “usual
328
When a bill in Congress explicitly
constitutional balance.”
conditions the receipt of federal funds on compliance with a standard
rather than a rule, it tees up just the sort of deliberation that the
clear-statement principle demands. Defenders of state prerogatives
can argue in congressional debates that conditioning federal funds on
compliance with open-textured standards will work too great an
imposition on the American scheme of federalism. The more open
textured are the standards imposed, the more salient those arguments
are likely to be in Congress. And when Congress clearly imposes
open-textured standards of liability on states in the face of the
potential salience of those arguments, it has made a clear “expression
of intent to ‘alter the usual constitutional balance between the States
329
and the Federal Government.’”
For similar reasons, contra proferentem principles ought not be
understood to require that contractual duties be framed as rules
rather than standards. As Professor Brian Galle points out, modern
contract theory recognizes that parties may have good reasons for
agreeing to open-textured duties, and that it is utility-maximizing to
330
enforce those duties. When a state agrees to accept federal funds,
and the law makes clear that the funds are conditioned on the state’s
subjecting itself to an open-textured standard of liability, there is no
failure of notice. In the context of government contracts, courts have
articulated an exception to the contra proferentem doctrine in cases in
which the ambiguity in a contract is “patent” at the time the parties
331
entered into it. A similar principle ought to apply in the case of the
federal government’s “contracts” with state funding recipients.
Nor should the notice principle be read to require that damages
liability under conditional spending statutes be limited to cases in

328. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989)).
329. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208–09 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61). I therefore agree
with Professor Peter Smith that Congress should have no obligation to legislate with
extraordinary specificity in the conditional spending context, though (unlike him) I believe that
both the accountability and state choice models support that conclusion. See Smith, supra note
34, at 1210–12.
330. See Galle, supra note 34, at 170–74.
331. See, e.g., Interstate Gen. Gov’t Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433, 1434–35 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
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which high-level officials of the governmental entity that receives
federal funds have knowledge of the acts that violate those statutes.
To the extent that Gebser rested on the notion that the remedies
under Spending Clause legislation must, as a constitutional matter, be
332
so limited, the case was wrongly decided. If Congress gives the
states clear notice that a grant of federal funds is conditioned on the
state’s assumption of negligence liability—or even strict liability—for
violations of the grant’s requirements, all of the policies of the notice
requirement are satisfied. But to the extent that Gebser rested on a
presumption about what remedial rules Congress would have
333
intended—as important language in the Court’s opinion suggests —
the decision does not unduly constrain congressional power (though it
ought not be extended to statutes for which a contrary congressional
334
intent is apparent).
b. Predictive Assessment.
I have argued that substantial
normative objections can be raised against some significant possible
applications of the notice principle. But my point in this Article is not,
principally, normative. The essential question for my argument is
whether the Court is likely to agree with my normative concerns. I
predict that the Court will not, by and large, agree with those
concerns. It will continue on the path it started in Arlington Central of
expanding the notice principle.
The variant of the notice principle that is most likely to be in play
is the notice-of-application variant. Justice O’Connor provided the
fifth vote in Davis and Jackson to demand only general notice of how
Spending Clause statutes applied to particular facts. And the
gratuitous discussion of the notice requirement in Justice Alito’s
opinion for the Court in Arlington Central suggests that Justice Alito
would have joined the dissenters in those cases. There are good
reasons to think that the newly strengthened conservative majority
will adopt yet more stringent versions of the notice requirement.
First, unlike with the direct limitations discussed in Part I, the
notice requirement allows the Court to avoid the suggestion that it is
332. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284–89 (1998).
333. See id. at 290 (noting that Title IX’s “express enforcement scheme hinges its most
severe sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to obtain compliance” and stating that “we
cannot attribute to Congress the intention to have implied an enforcement scheme that allows
imposition of greater liability without comparable conditions”).
334. Gebser may well have been such a case, as Justice Stevens forcefully argued in his
dissent. See id. at 296–304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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second-guessing the policy preferences of Congress. Indeed, the
Court can solemnly state that it is completely willing to follow
Congress’s clear instructions. Chief Justice Roberts took this very line
in his confirmation hearings to defend cases like Gonzaga against
335
claims that they thwarted congressional will. Second, a stricter
version of the notice requirement will not pose the same problems of
analytic tractability as do the nexus and coercion requirements.
Notions of clarity and notice are highly context dependent. A ruling
that one statute did or did not satisfy the notice requirement is
therefore unlikely to set much precedent for whether any other
statute satisfies the requirement.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the notice requirement in
its post-Guardians form limits only private enforcement (for money
damages) in court; it does not limit the federal government from
withholding funds from a noncomplying recipient. This difference is
significant because most of the spending statutes supported by
conservatives depend only on withholding of funds, and not on third336
party judicial enforcement, for their success. By contrast, the
spending statutes liberals care about—Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act—all require private enforcement because the threat
337
that federal funds will be withheld is remote at best. The notice
requirement thus gives conservative Justices a way to limit
conditional spending programs supported by liberals without risking
much collateral damage to those programs supported by
conservatives.

335. Professor Simon Lazarus provides a thorough analysis of this aspect of the Justice
Roberts hearings. Lazarus, supra note 23, at 22–28.
336. It is no accident that the four most significant unconstitutional conditions cases
involving Spending Clause legislation in the past two decades, Rust, Velazquez, Finley, and
FAIR, have involved situations in which recipients sued to challenge the withholding of funding.
See supra note 172.
337. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF
TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 294–95 (1995) (noting reluctance of the
administrations of both political parties to use the fund-termination sanction). To be sure, there
are occasions in which the federal government decides to withhold funds. (Virginia Department
of Education v. Riley was one.) But the point is that those occasions are an exceedingly tiny
proportion of the cases in which funding recipients violate these statutes.
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CONCLUSION
I contend that the Roberts Court is likely to limit Congress’s
conditional spending authority. But it is not likely to do so directly by
holding that certain funding conditions are unconstitutional. Instead,
the Court is likely to act indirectly by limiting private parties’ ability
to enforce funding conditions. The Rehnquist Court took some steps
in this direction, but it drew back in cases like Davis and Jackson.
Those cases would likely have come out differently in the Roberts
Court, and the Court will not want for opportunities to reverse
338
them—in substance if not in form. If and when the Court does so, its
decisions will not draw the headlines of cases like Boerne and Garrett.
But those decisions will have as great an effect—if not a greater
effect—on the world.

338. As the Court showed when it upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in an opinion
that was flatly inconsistent with—but did not formally overrule—its decision in Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court is certainly capable of effectively but not formally
overruling prior precedent, see Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1635–38 (2007); see also id.
at 1640–53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s decision was inconsistent with
Stenberg and other precedent).

